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CANADA HOMICIDE VICTIMS BY YEAR
PROVINCIAL HOMICIDE VICTIMS  
Province 2018 2017 +/- % Change
BC 89 119 -30 -33.7%
QC 83 93 -10 -12.0%
NS 11 21 -10 -90.9%
MB 55 47 8 14.5%
NU 8 6 2 25.0%
YT 3 8 -5 -166.7%
AB 81 119 -38 -46.9%
PEI 0 2 -2 0%
NB 13 10 3 23.1%
NWT 6 2 4 66.7%
NL 2 4 -2 -100.0%
ON 266 197 69 25.9%
SK 34 38 -4 -11.8%
More at p. 4
CANADA SEES DECLINE IN 
HOMICIDE RATE
Statistics Canada has released 
the homicide numbers for 
2018. Last year, police 
repor ted 651 homicide 
victims in Canada. This was a 
decrease of 15 victims from 
2017. The homicide rate per 100,000 population 
was 1.76, down 3.62% from 2017. 
The most substantial year-over-year increase 
occurred in Ontario (+69). Alberta (-38) and BC 
(-30) reported the largest declines.
Upcoming Seminar
INVESTIGATIVE INTERACTIONS
Stops, Searches & Statements See p. 3
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Unless otherwise noted all articles are authored by 
Mike  Novakowski, MA, LLM. The articles contained 
herein are provided for information purposes only 
and are not to be construed as legal or other 
professional advice. The opinions expressed herein 
are not necessarily  the opinions of the Justice 
Institute of British Columbia. “In Service: 10-8” 
welcomes your comments or contributions to this 
newsletter.   
Advanced Police Training
at the Justice Institute of BC
Looking to refresh or develop your current skills? 
The JIBC’s Advanced Training Program provides 
in-depth development opportunities for law 
enforcement officers. Some of our courses involve 
training in traditional and online investigations; 
patrol operations, as well as surveillance 
techniques and developing leadership skills. 
Sworn municipal officers, RCMP, peace officers, 
and other law enforcement officers (by approval) 
are encouraged to register. 
Upcoming Courses for 2019
General Investigative Skills @ Victoria 
Campus: September 16-20
Interviewing Special Needs Witnesses @ 
New West Campus: September 18-20 
          
Advanced Tactical Surveillance @ New West 
Campus: September 23-26
Search & Seizure @ New West Campus: 
September 23-27
Coaching and Mentoring @ Victoria 
Campus: September 25-27
Police Leadership Development @ Victoria 
Campus: September 30-October 4
Search & Seizure @ Victoria Campus: 
September 30-October 4
Advanced Police Training Contact Information
advancedpolicetraining@jibc.ca
604-528-5761
**2019 Course Calendar here** 
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INVESTIGATIVE INTERACTIONS: 
Stops, Searches & Statements 
Instructor: Mike Novakowski (M.O.M., M.A., L.L.M.) is a serving police officer and member of the Canadian 
Association of Law Teachers. He has a Master of Arts degree in Leadership and Training and a Master of Laws degree 
from Osgoode Hall Law School specializing in Criminal Law and Procedure. He is a former JIBC Police Academy 
legal studies instructor, has taught several advanced police training courses and is currently a sessional instructor at 
UFV in the School of Criminology and Criminal Justice. Mike is the author and editor of “In Service: 10-8”, a peer 
read newsletter devoted to operational police officers in Canada, and the case law editor for Blue Line magazine. 
Mike’s law degree, experience as a police officer and passion for teaching gives him a unique perspective to present an 
exciting seminar that is a must see for all police officers. 
Date:  
October 8, 2019 
9:00 am – 3:00 pm 
 
Location: 
JIBC Theatre 
715 McBride Boulevard 
New Westminster, BC 
 
How to Register: 
Email: Karlo Avenido 
kavenido@jibc.ca or contact 
your Training Section to 
register through eCourse. 
 
Registration Fee: 
$100 (plus GST) 
 
Restricted to law 
enforcement officers. 
 
For more information: 
Email: Advanced Police 
Training Manager Nancy Jolin 
njolin@jibc.ca  
 
Law enforcement officers must understand the ever-changing legal 
landscape under which they carry out their duties on a daily basis. Police 
encounters with the public range from casual contacts through detention to 
arrest. Searches attaching to these encounters run the gamut from none at 
all, through pat-downs to penal swabs. A failure to appreciate and correctly 
apply the law in these areas can lead to serious consequences, including 
criminal sanctions against individual officers, the exclusion of evidence and 
disciplinary action. Criminals can walk free and officers become frustrated 
by the process. This seminar will provide officers with a solid foundation in 
the principles of police powers in these areas 
• Significant Supreme Court of Canada judgments.  
• Types of police/citizen encounters. 
• Continuum of suspicion. 
• Vehicle stops. 
• Investigative detention. 
• Pat downs & frisks. 
• Arrest & search. 
• Right to counsel. 
• K-9 sniffs. 
• and much more. 
Topics include: 
Police Academy  
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WHAT’S NEW FOR POLICE IN 
THE LIBRARY
The Justice Institute of British Columbia Library is an 
excellent resource for learning. Here is a list of its 
recent acquisitions which may be of interest to 
police. 
Biased: uncovering the hidden prejudice that 
shapes what we see, think, and do.
Jennifer L. Eberhardt, PhD.
New York, NY: Viking, an imprint of Penguin 
Random House LLC, 2019.
BF 575 P9 E34 2019
The change makers: 25 leaders in their own 
words. 
Shaun Carney.
Carlton, Victoria: Melbourne University Press, 2019.
HM 1261 C37 2019
The Chicago manual of style.
Chicago, IL: The University of Chicago Press, 2017.
PE 1408 C455 2017
The disaster survival guide: how to prepare for 
and survive floods, fires, earthquakes, and more.
Marie D. Jones.
Canton, MI: Visible Ink Press, 2018.
GF 86 J664 2018
A history of law in Canada: volume 1: beginnings 
to 1866.
Philip Girard, Jim Phillips & R. Blake Brown.
Toronto, ON; Buffalo, NY; London: Published for The 
Osgoode Society  for Canadian Legal History  by 
University of Toronto Press, 2019.
KE 394 G57 2019
In command of guardians: executive servant 
leadership for the community of responders.
Eric J. Russell.
Cham, Switzerland : Springer, 2019.
HM 1261 R87 2019
Nine lies about work: a freethinking leader's 
guide to the real world.
Marcus Buckingham, Ashley Goodall.
Boston, MA: Harvard Business Review Press, 2019.
HD 58.9 B84 2019
No hard feelings: emotions at work (and how 
they help us succeed).
Liz Fosslien & Mollie West Duffy.
London, UK: Penguin Business, 2019.
HF 5548.8 F67 2019
No visible bruises: what we don't know about 
domestic violence can kill us.
Rachel Louise Snyder.
New York, NY: Bloomsbury Publishing Inc., 2019.
HV 6626.2 S59 2019
The power of apology: healing steps to transform 
all your relationships.
Beverly Engel.
New York, NY: J. Wiley, 2001.
BF 575 A75 E54 2001
Powerhouse: 13 teamwork tactics that build 
excellence and unrivalled success.
Kristine Lilly & John Gillis.
Austin, TX: Greenleaf Book Group Press, 2019.
HD 66 L55 2019
Stop talking, start influencing: 12 insights from 
brain science to make your message stick.
 Jared Cooney Horvath, PhD, MEd.
 Chatswood, NSW : Exisle Publishing, 2019.
BF 774 H67 2019
Until we reckon: violence, mass incarceration, 
and a road to repair.
Danielle Sered.
New York, NY: The New Press, 2019.
HV 8688 S47 2019
Workplace health and safety crimes.
Norm Keith.
Toronto, ON: LexisNexis Canada, 2019.
KE 3365 K45 2019
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BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com
IT’S TIME TO SPEAK UP ABOUT MENTAL HEALTH.
SHARE IT. DON’T WEAR IT.
WORKSAFEBCVOLUNTEER 
FIREFIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION 
OF BC
BC MUNICIPAL 
CHIEFS 
OF POLICE
BC EMERGENCY 
HEALTH 
SERVICES
BRITISH COLUMBIA 
PROFESSIONAL 
FIRE FIGHTERS 
ASSOCIATION
FIRE CHIEFS’ 
ASSOCIATION
 OF BC
CANADA 
BORDER 
SERVICES 
AGENCY
FIRST NATIONS 
EMERGENCY 
SERVICES 
SOCIETY OF 
BRITISH COLUMBIA
GREATER 
VANCOUVER 
FIRE CHIEFS
 ASSOCIATION
PROVINCE 
OF BC
TRANSIT 
POLICE
ROYAL 
CANADIAN 
MOUNTED 
POLICE
AMBULANCE 
PARAMEDICS 
OF BRITISH 
COLUMBIA
BRITISH
 COLUMBIA 
POLICE 
ASSOCIATION
www.BCFirstRespondersMentalHealth.com 
For more resources on better understanding mental health in the context of the 
experiences and pressures of first responders, as well as the broader population, 
visit the following link.
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Homicide Rates
The Census Metropolitan Area (CMA) of Thunder 
Bay, ON had the highest homicide rate of all CMAs 
at 6.38 homicides per 100,000 people. This was 
followed by Brantford, ON (3.36), Regina, SK 
(3.10) and Abbotsford-Mission, BC (3.07). The 
average non-CMA homicide rate was 1.98  while 
Canada’s overall rate was 1.76.
Gang-Related Homicides
Gang-related homicides dropped to 157 in 2018, 
down 6  from 2017, and accounted for 24% of all 
homicides. The largest increases of gang-related 
homicides occurred in Quebec (+17) and Ontario 
(+3). Overall, Ontario and Quebec numbers 
accounted for 53% of all gang-related homicides. 
Quebec had the highest proportion of gang-related 
homicides at 38.6%  of the province’s total. BC 
followed at 37.1%, Alberta at 27.2%  and 
Saskatchewan at 23.5%.
Firearm-Related Homicides
There were 249  firearm-related homicides (38.2% 
of all homicides) reported in Canada in 2018, 18 
less than in 2017. 
2018 HOMICIDE RATES - Select CMAs
CMA Rate Homicides
2018 2017 Change
Thunder Bay, ON 6.38 8 7 +1
Brantford, ON 3.36 5 5 0
Regina, SK 3.10 8 9 -1
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 3.07 6 9 -3
Windsor, ON 2.86 10 3 +7
Winnipeg, MB 2.69 22 24 -2
Edmonton, AB 2.60 37 49 -12
Saskatoon, SK 2.44 8 5 +3
Toronto, ON 2.26 142 93 +49
Sherbrooke, QC 1.97 4 1 +3
Non-CMAs 1.98 210 238 -28
Canada 1.76 651 666 -15
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GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES BY YEAR
2018 GANG-RELATED HOMICIDES
Area TotalHomicides
Gang-
Related % Rate
BC 89 33 37.1% 0.66
AB 81 22 27.2% 0.51
SK 34 8 23.5% 0.69
MB 55 5 9.1% 0.52
ON 266 51 19.2% 0.36
QC 83 32 38.6% 0.38
Atlantic 26 4 15.4% 0.17
Territories 17 0 0.0% 0.00
Canada 651 157 24.1% 0.42
100
200
300
2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
249267
223
179155
FIREARM-RELATED HOMICIDES
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Other Methods of Death
Of the 2018 homicides in 
which a cause of death was 
identified, 28.1% of homicide 
victims were stabbed, 18.3% 
were beaten, and 5.5% were 
strangled. Other causes of 
death included shaken baby 
syndrome, poisoning, exposure 
or hypothermia, fire  (eg. smoke inhalation or burns) 
and by motor vehicle.
Spousal Homicide
Of the 2018 homicides in which a relationship was 
determined, 62  people were identified as the 
victim of a spousal homicide. Ontario had the most 
spousal homicides at 21 while Quebec had the 
least at 3.
Notes:
• Atlantic Region includes Newfoundland and 
Labrador, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia and 
New Brunswick.
• Territories include Yukon, Northwest Territories and 
Nunavut.
Source: Homicide Survey. Data Release July 22, 2019. [accessed 
August 23, 2019]  
2018 FIREARM-RELATED HOMICIDES BY TYPE
FIREARM TYPE Number
Handgun 143
Rifle or Shotgun 56
Sawed-off Rifle or Shotgun 18
Fully Automatic Firearm 2
Other Firearm-Type Unknown 30
TOTAL 249
HOMICIDES BY METHOD
Method Number %
Shooting 249 38.2%
Stabbing 183 28.1%
Beating 119 18.3%
Strangulation 36 5.5%
Fire (burns/suffocation) 9 1.4%
Other methods 29 4.5%
Method unknown 26 4.0%
TOTAL 651 100%
0
50
100
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62535665
67
VICTIMS OF SPOUSAL HOMICIDES
2018 SPOUSAL HOMICIDES
Area TotalHomicides Spousal %
BC 89 5 5.6%
AB 81 9 11.1%
SK 34 5 14.7%
MB 55 9 16.4%
ON 266 21 7.9%
QC 83 3 3.6%
Atlantic 26 4 15.4%
Territories 17 6 35.3%
Canada 651 62 9.5%
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FIREARMS REGULATIONS 
CONSIDERED IN UNSAFE 
STORAGE CHARGE
R. v. Williams, 2019 NBCA 51
Dur ing a l a rge sca le po l i ce 
investigation into drug trafficking 
dubbed Operation J-Tornado, the 
accused’s home was searched under 
a warrant. At the time of the  search, 
the accused was residing in the home with his wife 
and their two children, then aged five and eight. 
Police found the following:
• Master Bedroom
‣ on top of a night table 
- a  locked gun vault 
case  containing a 
loaded .45 calibre 
handgun without a 
trigger lock along with 
a second loaded magazine. A key to the 
case was in a nearby drawer.
‣ on the floor near the night table - a box 
containing 10 full boxes of Winchester .45 
calibre ammunition.
‣ walk-in closet - a locked large metal gun 
cabinet. The key was found under some 
clothing  on a shelf above the cabinet. Inside 
the cabinet were a loaded semi-automatic 
rifle and a loaded shotgun. Neither had a 
trigger lock.
• Main Floor Living Room 
‣ hidden inside a coffee table  - a gun vault 
case containing a loaded .45 calibre 
handgun without a  trigger lock along with a 
second loaded magazine.
‣ on top of a stereo speaker - a loaded 
m a g a z i n e c o n t a i n i n g . 4 5 c a l i b r e 
ammunition.
 
• Kitchen 
‣ on a counter near a toaster - a loaded 
magazine.
The accused had acquired all the  firearms and 
ammunition legally, and possessed the proper 
authorizations and permits. The accused was 
nevertheless charged with two counts of carless 
storage of firearms and ammunition under s. 86(1) 
of the Criminal Code. 
New Brunswick Provincial Court
The trial judge referred to the Storage, 
Display, Transportation and Handling of 
Firearms by Individuals Regulations to 
inform his analysis of what Parliament 
considered unsafe with respect to the storage of 
firearms and ammunition under s. 86(1). The judge 
concluded “that the storage of [the accused’s] 
firearms and ammunition fell below the  standard 
of care required to ensure that no person is 
endangered by the firearms and ammunition in 
question.” He stated:
In my view, the defendant himself was a 
knowledgeable and experienced gun owner 
and should have known that his storage of 
these items was not acceptable or prudent in 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 86 Criminal Code
Careless use of firearm, etc.
 s. 86 (1) Every person commits an offence who, 
without lawful excuse, uses, carries, handles, 
ships, transports or stores a firearm, a 
prohibited weapon, a restricted weapon, a 
prohibited device or any ammunition or prohibited ammunition 
in a careless manner or without reasonable precautions for the 
safety of other persons.
Contravention of storage regulations, etc.
s. 86(2) Every person commits an offence who contravenes a 
regulation made under paragraph 117(h) of the Firearms Act 
respecting the storage, handling, transportation, shipping, 
display, advertising and mail-order sales of firearms and 
restricted weapons.
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the circumstances, especially in the family 
home with young children present. For these 
reasons I find there has been a marked 
departure from the standard of care of a 
r ea sonab ly p ruden t pe r son in the se 
circumstances and that the Crown has proven 
all the essential elements of the counts […] 
beyond a reasonable doubt and I find the 
defendant guilty thereof.
The accused was convicted of the  unsafe storage 
charges under s. 86(1). 
New Brunswick Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his s. 
86(1) convictions arguing that 
it was unreasonable for the 
trial judge to find the storage 
of his firearms and ammunition to be unsafe. He 
submitted that there was nothing unsafe about the 
manner in which he stored his firearms and 
ammunition. Among other things, he  contended 
that it was sufficient that the gun vault cases and 
the gun cabinet were kept locked (in spite of the 
keys being kept in close proximity and relatively 
easy to find). He also posited that ammunition is 
not unsafe and only presents a safety concern once 
it is loaded in a firearm.
 
Although the trial judge  did refer to the Storage, 
Display, Transportation and Handling of Firearms by 
Individuals Regulations in finding the  accused 
guilty under s. 86(1), he did not enter a conviction 
based only on non-compliance with the regulations 
under s. 86(2). Rather, he merely considered the 
Regulations to assist in his analysis of whether the 
accused had contravened s. 86(1). Justice  Green, 
delivering the Court of Appeal’s decision, 
concluded the trial judge did not err in finding the 
conduct of the accused showed “a marked 
departure from the standard of care of a 
reasonably prudent person.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
PUBLIC INTEREST SERVED BY 
DETERRING BAD DRIVING 
BEHAVIOUR
McEachern v. British Columbia (Superintendent 
of Motor Vehicles), 
2019 BCCA 195
A 17-year-old novice driver was 
issued a violation ticket for using an 
electronic  device while driving, 
contrary to s.  30.072(1)(a) of BC’s 
Motor Vehicle Act (MVA) Regulations. 
Novice drivers are subject to the province’s 
Graduated Licensing Program (GLP), under which 
drivers are closely monitored and are  subject to a 
lower threshold for in tervent ion by the 
Superintendent of Motor Vehicles. The driver 
disputed the ticket but was convicted. She had no 
other infractions on her driving record. 
Superintendent's Decision
Two weeks after her conviction, the 
Superintendent notified the driver of 
an intention to prohibit her for a 
period of three months due to her 
unsatisfactory  driving record. She applied for a 
review of the notice which was upheld, but the 
prohibition period was reduced from three  months 
to two by the reviewing officer:
Your driving record indicates that you received 
an offence for use electronic device while 
driving on September 17, 2016. Please be 
advised that use electronic device while driving 
offences are a serious public safety concern 
and are now one of the leading causes of motor 
vehicle related fatalities in BC. Drivers in the 
Graduated Licensing Program (GLP) have 
significantly higher accident rates than more 
experienced drivers. When a GLP driver 
commits driving infractions this risk increases.
I have considered your legal representative’s 
written submission, and reviewed your driving 
record. While I cannot ignore your driving 
behaviour, I have given some weight to your 
personal circumstances; therefore, I have 
decided to reduce the term of your prohibition 
from driving from three months to two months.
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British Columbia Supreme Court
The driver appealed the reviewing 
officer’s decision under s. 94. The judge 
allowed the appeal and revoked the 
prohibition, holding that a  single 
infraction could not reasonably justify a prohibition 
under s. 93(1)(a)(ii). The judge  found the prohibition 
was upheld solely on the basis of the driver’s 
driving record, which contained only a  single entry, 
and no other evidence was considered in 
determining whether there was a need to protect 
the public. As such, the judge ruled the reviewing 
officer’s decision was unreasonable. The driver’s 
appeal was allowed and the Superintendent was 
ordered to terminate the prohibition.
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Superintendent argued 
that the Supreme Court judge 
erred in concluding that a 
single violation ticket could 
not support the imposition of a driving  prohibition 
under s. 93(1)(a)(ii) and in finding that the decision 
to do so was unreasonable. 
s. 93(1)(a)(ii)
Under s. 93(1)(a)(ii) of the MVA, the Superintendent 
is granted discretion to prohibit a person from 
driving. The provision read as follows:
s. 93 (1) Even though a person is or may be 
subject to another prohibition from driving, if 
the superintendent considers it to be in the 
public interest, the superintendent may, with 
or without a hearing, prohibit the person 
from driving a motor vehicle (a) if the  person 
… (ii) has a driving record that in the opinion 
of the superintendent is unsatisfactory …
Under s.  93(2), the Superintendent may consider 
“all or any part of the  person’s driving record” in 
forming an opinion as to whether that driving 
record is unsatisfactory.
The Court of Appeal concluded that the judge was 
wrong in concluding that s.  93(1)(a)(ii) did not 
permit the imposition of a driving prohibition for a 
single infraction. There is no need that a driving 
record reflect “a pattern of conduct that may 
continue and pose a danger to the public” and 
therefore show that the individual was “a 
dangerous driver who might put the  safety  of the 
public at risk”. Justice Fisher stated:
It is true that a driving prohibition imposed under 
s.  93(1)(a)(ii) is predicated upon a connection 
between an unsatisfactory driving record and the 
public interest. However, nowhere does the statute 
suggest that the public interest is limited to 
prohibiting only drivers considered to be 
dangerous or potentially dangerous. The public 
interest may be served not only by keeping 
potentially dangerous drivers off the road but also 
by deterring poor driving behaviour, especially in 
respect of new drivers. [para. 27]
And further:
. . . I agree wi th the submiss ion of the 
Superintendent that the public interest purpose in 
s. 93(1)(a)(ii) may be fulfilled by an interpretation 
that permits intervention before a driver engages in 
a pattern of dangerous driving behaviour. Whether 
one infraction is sufficiently serious to warrant the 
Superintendent’s intervention will depend on the 
circumstances of the case. [para. 31]
“It is true that a driving prohibition imposed under s. 93(1)(a)(ii) is predicated upon a 
connection between an unsatisfactory driving record and the public interest. However, 
nowhere does the statute suggest that the public interest is limited to prohibiting only 
drivers considered to be dangerous or potentially dangerous. The public interest may be 
served not only by keeping potentially dangerous drivers off the road but also by 
deterring poor driving behaviour, especially in respect of new drivers.
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In this case, the Superintendent considered more 
than the “single infraction” but rather the infraction 
in the context of the driver’s entire driving record: 
Justice Fisher wrote:
The undisputed facts in this case are that 
Ms.  McEachern, while holding a Class 7 
driver’s license, used an electronic device while 
driving, contrary to s.  30.072(1)(a) of the 
Regulations. Using an electronic device while 
driving is considered serious enough by the 
Superintendent that this regulation creates a 
condition that is attached to a Class 7 license 
and it is listed on Ms. McEachern’s license as a 
“restriction/endorsement”. The violation 
resulted in four penalty points registered on 
Ms. McEachern’s driving record. [para. 40]
The Superintendent deserved deference in his 
decision. While the Superintendent may have been 
described as harsh and he could have imposed a 
lesser intervention, it fell within a range of possible, 
acceptable outcomes and was not unreasonable. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CONVICTION FOR ASSAULT 
PEACE OFFICER BY SPITTING 
UPHELD
R. v. Hominuk, 2019 MBCA 64   
The accused, a correctional inmate, 
tried to choke herself with a  piece of 
ripped bedding.  Correctional officers 
unsuccessfully attempted to restrain 
her with hand and leg  cuffs. She 
actively resisted, yelled and refused to obey the 
officers’ directions to 
calm down.  As the 
officers were placing her 
in a  restraint chair, the 
accused spat several feet 
above the heads of the 
officers.  However, her 
spit landed on the face 
of an officer who was 
trying to restrain her.  
Manitoba Provincial Court
The judge rejected the accused’s 
evidence that she did not intend to spit 
on the officers but, rather, into the air 
with the intent that the  spit would fall 
back on her. She testified that she did not recall 
why she was trying to choke  herself, and that she 
panicked and actively resisted officers when they 
came into her cell because she did not want to be 
restrained. She said that, during the course of being 
restrained, she had phlegm in her throat and was 
choking and that is why she spat. 
Although the  judge found the accused was 
(a) hysterical and out of control at the time of the 
offence; (b) could not have known what was going 
on at the  time of the offence due to her state of 
mind; (c)  was unable to apply reason to her 
thoughts or actions at the time of the offence; and 
(d) did not intend to hit the officer with her spit, he 
nevertheless found she intentionally spat at them. 
The accused was convicted of assaulting a police 
officer under. s 270(1) of the Criminal Code. 
Manitoba Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred because he 
failed to apply the  correct legal 
test regarding the mens rea 
requirement for assault and the facts he accepted 
were incompatible with a guilty  finding. But the 
Court of Appeal rejected the accused’s submissions 
even though the trial judge’s reasons were 
“inelegant” and “far from perfect”. 
First, the accused agreed she need not have had the 
intent to spit on the officer that she ultimately hit.  
Rather, all that was required was the intent that the 
spit make contact with any one of the officers. 
Second, the finding that she was “hysterical” or 
“out of control” did not necessarily  lead to the 
conclusion that she was unable to form the 
minimal intent required for assault. Moreover, 
much of the trial judge’s findings that the accused 
complained about were directed to her credibility 
and not to the issue of her intent. 
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Videos of the incident tendered as evidence also 
supported the accused’s conviction. The Appeal 
Court stated:
There is no doubt that a review of the video 
evidence shows that the accused was very 
upset. She was yelling and resisting the 
officers’ attempts to restrain her.   She agreed 
that she was engaging in this behaviour as she 
did not want to be restrained.  There is also no 
question that the spit was forceful, deliberate 
and that there were a number of officers 
directly above her at the time.  In light of the 
fact that the officers were restraining her legs 
and arms, the trial judge concluded that 
spitting was the only option she had in terms of 
trying to assault any of the officers involved 
and that she intentionally did so.  We are not 
convinced that he erred in this regard. [para. 
11]
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
OBJECTIVE GROUNDS FOR 
ARREST CONSIDERS ALL OF 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES
R. v. Ballantine, 2019 ONCA 498
 
After drinking beer and wine 
throughout the day and into the 
evening when it was getting dark at 
about 9:00 pm, the accused took 
control of a  boat. Travelling at 25-30 
mph in unfamiliar waters, the accused failed to 
follow directions and, about a minute after taking 
control of the boat, he turned the boat on a sharp 
angle up over the rocky shore of an island and 
directly  into a tree. Two of the boat’s passengers 
were ejected and injured.
The first officer on the scene arrived at 9:51 pm 
and by 10:00 pm, having formed reasonable 
grounds, he arrested the accused for impaired 
operation of a vessel. The officer read the accused 
a breath demand and he was transported to the 
police station where he provided two samples of 
his breath registering readings of 82 and 75 mg%. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The judge concluded that the arrest was 
lawful. There was an accident where the 
operator of a boat somehow managed 
to crash into an island with sufficient 
force to cause two passengers to be ejected. The 
officer also spoke with a witness, who identified 
the accused as the operator of the boat. The 
accused admitted he had consumed alcohol, had 
an odour of alcohol coming from his breath, had 
red or glossy eyes and was unsteady. “While [the 
accused’s] red or glossy  eyes and his unsteadiness 
in the context of a recent accident and the natural 
terrain might not in and of themselves be 
sufficient to indicate impairment, the assessment 
of the objective reasonableness of the officer’s 
grounds is not an exercise in parsing off indicia, 
but one of considering all of the circumstances 
that the officer was presented with,” said the 
judge. “[The officer’s] grounds to make the arrest 
were both subjectively reasonable, and in the 
context of the totality of the circumstances, 
objectively reasonable.”
A forensic toxicologist was called as an expert 
witness by the Crown and performed a retrograde 
extrapolation of the accused’s BAC at the time of 
the incident. Based on a number of assumptions, 
the toxicologist projected the accused’s BAC to be 
between 80 and 140 mg%. The toxicologist also 
opined that a person would be impaired at this 
BAC although he could not specifically say  that the 
accused was impaired without individualized 
testing of the accused’s reaction to alcohol.
The accused was convicted on two counts of 
impaired operation of a vessel causing bodily harm 
and sentenced to 18 months’ imprisonment, 12 
months’ probation, and a two-year driving 
prohibition. Restitution, no-contact and victim 
surcharge orders were also imposed.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused challenged his 
convictions arguing, in part, 
that the arresting officer did not 
have the requisite reasonable 
and probable grounds to make the arrest for 
impaired operation of the boat.
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Reasonable Grounds for Arrest
The accused submitted that the officer’s subjective 
belief that there were reasonable and probable 
grounds for arrest was rendered objectively 
unreasonable because he failed to conduct any 
investigation into the circumstances leading to the 
accident before he arrested the accused. In his 
view, the trial judge simply reasoned backwards 
from the fact of the accident, which resulted in 
injuries, to impairment.
The Court of Appeal rejected this argument. Before 
the accused was arrested, the  officer observed the 
scene of the accident. He spoke with a witness who 
identified the accused as the operator of the boat. 
He also spoke to and observed the accused, who 
admitted he had consumed alcohol. The trial judge 
did not err in holding that the officer’s grounds to 
make the arrest were  both subjectively and 
objectively reasonable.
The accused’s appeal from conviction was 
dismissed, but the victim surcharge order imposed 
at sentencing was quashed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
FAX TELEWARRANT NEED NOT 
BE RECORDED VERBATIM
R. v. DiBenedetto, 2019 ONCA 496
Acting on information provided by 
f ive con f iden t i a l i n fo rman t s , 
surveillance, various police reports, 
other investigative tools and training 
and experience, a police affiant used 
the telewarrant procedure under s. 487.1 of the 
Criminal Code to obtain warrants to search both a 
r u r a l a n d r e s i d e n t i a l p r o p e r t y f o r 
methamphetamine, clandestine lab equipment, 
associated paraphernalia, tools of the trade and the 
proceeds of crime. The ITO alleged that there were 
reasonable grounds to believe that the  accused and 
another person were committing various offences 
involving the production of controlled substances. 
The warrants were granted, but expired before they 
could be executed. 
The next day, the affiant resubmitted the 
application to the telewarrant centre. A different 
justice denied the application because of 
“insufficient grounds”. Later that day, the ITO 
affiant resubmitted the application after making 
corrections and adding contents to the previously 
rejected ITO. The new justice who received the  ITO 
telephoned the affiant and sought information 
about which paragraphs of the ITO contained the 
added contents. This call was not recorded, nor was 
the ITO affiant under oath.
When the warrants were executed, police located a 
methamphetamine lab inside a barn. They also 
found $53,000 cash, as well as numerous 
publications referencing drugs and how to 
manufacture them, from inside the residence. The 
a c c u s e d w a s c o n v i c t e d o f p r o d u c i n g 
methamphetamine, possessing methamphetamine 
BY THE BOOK:
s. 487.1 Criminal Code
Telewarrants
487.1  (1)  If a peace officer believes that an 
indictable offence has been committed and that 
it would be impracticable to appear personally 
before a justice to make an application for a 
warrant in accordance with section 487, the peace officer may 
submit an information on oath by telephone or other means of 
telecommunication to a justice designated for the purpose by 
the chief judge of the provincial court having jurisdiction in the 
matter.
Information submitted by telephone
(2) An information submitted by telephone or other means of 
telecommunication, other than a means of telecommunication 
that produces a writing, shall be on oath and shall be recorded 
verbatim by the justice, who shall, as soon as practicable, 
cause to be filed, with the clerk of the court for the territorial 
division in which the warrant is intended for execution, the 
record or a transcription of it, certified by the justice as to 
time, date and contents.
[...]
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for the purpose of trafficking and possessing the 
proceeds of crime. He was sentenced to five years 
imprisonment.
Ontario Superior Court of Justice
Among other things, the accused 
chal lenged the issuance of the 
telewarrants arguing they were  fatally 
flawed because the  ITO affiant and 
issuing justice had failed to comply with the 
requirements of s. 487.1(2) of the Criminal Code. 
But the judge concluded that s. 487.1(2) did not 
apply. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that s. 
487.1(2) required that the 
conversation between the ITO 
affiant and issuing  justice 
(pointing out the paragraphs added to the 
previously rejected ITO) had to be under oath, 
recorded verbatim and a certified copy of the 
recording or a transcription of it filed with the 
court. Because this was not done, the accused 
contended the warrant-issuing process was invalid.
The Court of Appeal, however, agreed with the trial 
judge that s. 487.1(2) did not apply. “The ITO was 
submitted by fax, which, for the purposes of s. 
487.1(2), is a  means of telecommunication that 
produces a  writing,”  said the Appeal Court. “The 
subsection only requires ‘an information’, that is 
to say, the ITO, to be on oath and recorded 
verbatim if it is submitted ‘other than” [by] a 
means of telecommunication that produces a 
writing’. That is simply not this case. And at all 
events, the  additional material was contained in 
the ITO. The mischief at which s. 487.1(2) is 
directed is not at work here.”
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
Editor’s Note: Additional details taken from R. v. 
DiBenedetto, 2017 ONSC 204.
KEY TO GROW-OP ADMITTED 
DESPITE s. 10(b) CHARTER 
BREACH
R. v. Do, 2019 ONCA 482
The police executed a search warrant 
at a bungalow and seized a large 
quantity  of marihuana and several 
items linking the accused to the 
grow-op found therein. Several hours 
later, the accused arrived on the scene and was 
arrested just after she approached the home. She 
was searched incident to arrest and the police 
seized the key to the front door. The accused 
immediately requested access to her lawyer, but 
she was kept at the scene while officers completed 
their work. She was then transported to the police 
station where she was required to wait over three 
hours before being permitted to contact a lawyer. 
Ontario Court of Justice
The accused was convicted of 
producing marihuana and possessing 
mar ihuana for the purpose of 
trafficking. 
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued her Charter 
right to contact counsel under 
s. 10(b) was breached, and that 
this breach tainted not only the 
“The ITO was submitted by fax, which, for the purposes of s. 487.1(2), is a means of 
telecommunication that produces a writing. The subsection only requires ‘an information’, 
that is to say, the ITO, to be on oath and recorded verbatim if it is submitted ‘other 
than’ [by] a means of telecommunication that produces a writing’. That is simply not this 
case.”
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seizure of the house key, but also the drugs and 
other items seized under the search warrant. The 
Crown conceded a s. 10(b) breach given the delay 
of the police implementing the accused’s right to 
counsel.
Admissibility
The Court of Appeal distinguished between the 
seizure of the drugs and other items under the 
search warrant, and the seizure  of the house key 
from the accused when she was arrested. “The 
earlier seizure of the drugs and other items under 
a valid search warrant properly executed was a 
transaction largely completed at the time of the 
[accused’s] arrest, and was not precipitated by it,” 
said the Court of Appeal. “It was causally, 
temporally and contextually distinct and separate 
from the arrest. Any possible breach of s. 10(b) in 
the time following the [accused’s] arrest does not 
attach to that evidence.” The evidence seized 
under the warrant was not obtained in a manner 
that infringed a Charter right and therefore was not 
subject to exclusion under s. 24(2).
The key, however, was obtained in a manner that 
breached the Charter. “The police seized the key to 
the front door of the residence where the seizure 
of drugs was made from the [accused] incident to 
her arrest,”  said the Court of Appeal. “Because of 
the temporal connection to any possible s. 10(b) 
breach, the key is arguably subject to exclusion.” 
Nevertheless, the key was admitted as evidence. 
“In our view the s. 10(b) breach was not strategic, 
nor was it serious or systemic,” said the Appeal 
Court. “The impact of the seizure of the  house key 
from the [accused] was minimal, because the 
validly obtained admissible evidence already 
connected her to the bungalow where the grow-op 
operated. As evidence, the key was real and 
reliable. Society has an interest in the [accused’s] 
trial on the merits, which favours the admission of 
the key.”
The Accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
CIRCUMSTANTIAL EVIDENCE 
SUFFICIENT TO PROVE 
AMBULANCE THIEF’S IDENTITY
R. v. Peoples, 2019 ABCA 256
 
The accused was a patient in the 
Emergency ward at a hospital during 
the evening. He had an air cast on 
his left leg, was carrying crutches 
a n d c a m e i n t o E m e r g e n c y 
complaining of excruciating pain in his leg. He was 
offered Tylenol or Advil for the pain, then left 
abruptly. Seven minutes later, an ambulance was 
stolen. 
About 13 minutes after that, a man who matched 
the accused’s description (wearing an air cast on 
his left foot and carrying crutches) was observed by 
a witness leaving the abandoned ambulance which 
was located about two kilometers away from the 
hospital. The witness called police. A few drug kits 
were missing from the back of the ambulance when 
it was found. The 
accused was charged 
with theft of a motor 
vehicle and medical 
supplies.
Alberta Provincial Court
The judge found the accused was a 
patient treated at the hospital and that 
he was identified by a nurse as being 
the person in the CCTV footage from 
the Emergency that evening. He was in a 
wheelchair holding crutches. The judge concluded 
that the person described by the witness leaving the 
ambulance had the same distinctive characteristics 
as the  accused, both as described by the nurse and 
as seen on the security footage. The judge rejected 
the argument that this could have simply been 
another individual walking down the street. He was 
satisfied that the only reasonable inference to be 
drawn from the  circumstantial evidence was that it 
was the accused who stole  the ambulance and the 
drug kits. The accused was found guilty of theft. 
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Alberta Court of Appeal
The accused submitted that 
the trial judge misapplied the 
l a w o f c i r c u m s t a n t i a l 
evidence in convicting the 
accused. The Court of Appeal disagreed and ruled 
that the trial judge correctly applied the test for 
circumstantial evidence to the facts he found. The 
inferences he drew from the evidence were the 
only reasonable ones available. 
The accused’s appeal was dismissed. 
Complete case available at www.canlii.org
ACCELERATING TO GROSSLY 
EXCESSIVE SPEED WHEN 
APPROACHING INTERSECTION 
WAS DANGEROUS
R. v. Chung, 2019 BCCA 206
The accused was driving his car 
when he approached a Vancouver 
intersection. The posted speed limit 
was 50 km/h, it was daylight and the 
roadway was damp. Visibility was 
good and traffic was relatively light (free flowing). 
There were several pedestrians in the  area and 
there were businesses nearby. 
The accused changed 
lanes abruptly in the 
block leading up to the 
intersect ion and he 
accelerated from 50 km/
h to 140 km/h and 
began passing vehicles 
on their right. He reached a speed of about 140 
km/h. Another car turning at the intersection was 
nearly struck. The accused braked as he entered the 
intersection where he then struck a left turning 
vehicle at 119 km/h, killing its driver. A dash cam 
video from a nearby motorist stopped at a  cross 
street showed the accused’s vehicle  travelling at a 
very high rate of speed approximately 1.2 seconds 
before the collision. The accused was charged with 
dangerous driving causing death.
British Columbia Provincial Court
The judge found that the actus reus for 
dangerous driving had been established. 
The excessive speed of the accused’s 
vehicle was dangerous. However, the 
judge held that the mental element of dangerous 
driving (mens rea) had not been proven because, in 
his view, a  driver’s excessive speed alone, if it 
continued for only a  few seconds and without other 
dangerous conduct, could not be said to constitute 
a “marked departure from the standard of a 
reasonably prudent driver”, a  requirement for a 
dangerous driving conviction. The accused was 
acquitted. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown appealed the 
accused’s acquittal arguing the 
trial judge erred in determining 
the  mens rea element of 
dangerous driving. 
Dangerous Driving
The crime of dangerous driving requires proof of 
both an actus reus and mens rea. The actus reus 
requires the Crown to prove beyond a reasonable 
doubt that the accused objectively drove in a 
manner that endangered the public, with regard to 
all of the circumstances surrounding the motor 
vehicle’s use. 
The mens rea element can take two forms: modified 
“objective  mens rea” or “subjective mens rea”. 
Objective mens rea requires a  marked departure 
from the standard of a reasonably prudent driver in 
the circumstances as the accused. This marked 
departure is more than a mere  departure sufficient 
for establishing civil negligence. Subjective mens 
rea - deliberate dangerous driving - will also 
support a conviction because intentionally creating 
a danger for other users within the meaning of s. 
249 of the Criminal Code will constitute a marked 
departure from the standard expected of a 
reasonably prudent driver.
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Proof of the actus reus, however, does not on its 
own, without more, support a reasonable inference 
that the mens rea  required was present. “Proof of 
dangerous driving, per se, is not enough to convict 
an accused,”  said Justice Groberman, delivering the 
Appeal Court’s judgment. “The driving must be so 
dangerous as to take it outside of the realm of 
mere negligence, momentary inattention, or an 
understandable misjudgment. Where the degree of 
dangerousness does take the driving beyond those 
types of errors, however, there is no basis for 
suggesting that the mental element of the crime 
cannot be inferred from the objectively dangerous 
driving.” 
In this case, the Court of Appeal concluded that the 
rapid acceleration and excessive speed that the 
accused exhibited in the seconds before the 
accident constituted a marked departure from the 
reasonable driver standard. Justice Groberman 
stated:
In my view, the trial judge’s conclusion that 
“momentary” speeding, without more, cannot 
sustain a conviction for dangerous driving was 
flawed. The judge failed to recognize that 
categorizing conduct simply as “speeding” fails 
to consider the degree to which the conduct 
departs from reasonable standards. While it is 
true that driving moderately in excess of the 
speed limit will not necessarily amount to a 
“marked departure” from reasonable standards 
of driving, driving at a grossly excessive speed 
will. In this case, I cannot understand how one 
could possibly describe the accused’s conduct 
in driving at almost three times the speed limit 
into a major urban intersection as anything but 
a marked departure from the standard expected 
of a reasonable driver. [para. 33]
And further:
[T]he conduct of [the accused] in this case was 
very clearly a marked departure from the 
standard of the reasonable driver. While he was 
not inattentive to his driving, his speeding was 
so wildly beyond any safe standard that it is 
appropriately branded as criminal.
The judge’s view that speeding alone, if it 
occurs over a relatively short period of time, 
cannot justify a criminal sanction is erroneous. 
[The accused’s] conduct in driving at a grossly 
excessive and obviously dangerous speed 
through a major intersection was blameworthy, 
and justifies the imposition of a criminal 
sanction. [paras. 39-40]
BY THE BOOK:
s. 249 Criminal Code
Dangerous operation of motor vehicles ...
s. 249  (1) Every one commits an offence who 
operates
(a) a motor vehicle in a manner 
that is dangerous to the public, 
h a v i n g r e g a r d t o a l l t h e 
circumstances, including the nature, condition and use of the 
place at which the motor vehicle is being operated and the 
amount of traffic that at the time is or might reasonably be 
expected to be at that place;
…
(4)Every one who commits an offence under subsection (1) 
and thereby causes the death of any other person is guilty of 
an indictable offence and liable to imprisonment for a term not 
exceeding fourteen years.
Dangerous operation
s. 320.13  (1)  Everyone commits an offence 
who operates a conveyance in a manner that, 
having regard to all of the circumstances, is 
dangerous to the public.
...
Operation causing death
(3) Everyone commits an offence who operates a conveyance 
in a manner that, having regard to all of the circumstances, is 
dangerous to the public and, as a result, causes the death of 
another person.
OLD
NEW
“I cannot understand how one could 
possibly describe the accused’s conduct in 
driving at almost three times the speed limit 
into a major urban intersection as anything 
but a marked departure from the standard 
expected of a reasonable driver.”
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[The accused’s] conduct in accelerating to a 
grossly excessive speed (almost three times the 
legal limit) when approaching a major urban 
intersection was obviously dangerous, and a 
marked departure from reasonable standards. 
[para. 44]
The Crown’s appeal was allowed, the accused’s 
acquittal was set aside and a conviction was 
entered. The matter was remitted back to Provincial 
Court for sentencing. 
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
PLAIN VIEW DOCTRINE 
EXAMINED: COCAINE BRICK 
ADMISSIBLE
R. v. Gill, 2019 BCCA 260
Two  police  officers went to the 
accused’s home to execute an 
impression  warrant in relation to his 
possible  connection to an earlier sale 
of two kilograms of cocaine to a 
police  agent. The accused was near the garage in 
front of his home and he answered to his 
first  name. An officer explained the impression 
warrant and told the accused that he was required 
to accompany them to the police station to provide 
fingerprints. In response, the accused motioned 
toward the front door of his home and indicated 
that he needed to go inside to tell his brother. The 
officers told him that he was 
not to enter the house and 
that he was being detained. 
However, the accused 
persisted by pulling toward 
the door.
The officers took down the accused to prevent him 
from entering the home. After tackling him, the 
officers noticed an unsealed envelope fell to the 
ground during the struggle. The accused was 
handcuffed. An officer retrieved the fallen envelope 
(and warrant which had also fallen in the course  of 
the struggle) and placed it on the trunk of the 
police vehicle. The envelope was then placed 
upright against the back of the front passenger seat 
of the police vehicle. The envelope’s unsealed flap 
g a p e d o p e n t o r e v e a l a 1 0 ”  x  6 ” x 
3”  vacuum  sealed rectangular brick wrapped in 
brown  material and some silver  tape. The officer 
recognized the  contents of the envelope as a 
kilogram of cocaine  based on his experience. The 
accused was subsequently  arrested for possessing a 
controlled substance. The cocaine was processed as 
an exhibit and the accused was charged with 
possessing cocaine for the purpose of trafficking. 
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge, accepting the officer’s 
evidence, found the discovery of the 
cocaine brick met the requirements of 
the common law “plain view” doctrine:
1. The police were in the process of detaining the 
accused pursuant to a valid impression warrant 
when the envelope containing the cocaine 
dropped from the accused’s person and was 
retrieved by police;
2. [The officer] was legally obliged to pick up the 
envelope and to take steps to secure it with its 
contents, as it was part of the accused’s personal 
effects upon detention;
3. The envelope was not sealed at the time and its 
flap was not adhering to close the top edge of the 
envelope;
4. When [the officer] took steps to secure the 
envelope with its contents in his police vehicle, 
the top of the envelope with the flap opened 
such that [the officer] was able to see that it 
contained a brick-like package he associated 
with cocaine; and
5. ... I do not find that [the officer] engaged in a 
positive action to make the interior of the 
envelope visible. Rather, given the size of the 
envelope, its contents, and the fact that the 
envelope was not sealed, the interior of the 
envelope became visible to him inadvertently 
given the size of its contents once it was placed, 
as he described, leaning against the back of the 
front passenger seat.
There was no s. 8 Charter breach, the cocaine brick 
was admissible as evidence  and the accused was 
convicted of possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking.
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British Columbia Court of Appeal
The accused challenged 
his conviction, in part, 
by arguing that the plain 
view doctrine did not 
apply. He suggested that the officer 
conducted an unauthorized search; he did 
not accidentally  stumble across evidence in 
plain view. In his opinion, the  officer’s 
conduct which led him to see inside the 
envelope was deliberate and calculated, not 
unintentional, especially when he placed the 
envelope upright on the vehicle’s front passenger 
seat. He emphasized the numerous interactions the 
officer had with the envelope: first picking it up off 
the ground and placing it on the  trunk; then picking 
it up again to move the envelope to inside the 
vehicle; then placing the envelope upright on the 
front passenger seat so that the weight of it 
combined with the unsealed flap made the inside 
visible. He contended the officer knew that the 
accused was being investigated in relation to a drug 
trafficking operation that involved the sale of 
cocaine bricks, and so he must have been “primed” 
to think about bricks of cocaine. Moreover, he 
alleged that if touching and moving the envelope 
did not lead the  officer to detect the envelope 
contained cocaine, then visibly seeing the object 
would not have advanced the officer’s belief that it 
was immediately apparent that the  item was 
probably connected to criminal activity. 
Plain View Doctrine
Justice Griffin, authoring the Court of Appeal’s 
unanimous judgment, first noted the purpose of s. 8 
of the Charter:
Section  8 of the Charter guarantees everyone 
“the right to be secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure.” This section protects privacy 
interests and is an important check on police 
conduct.
To establish that a state act of search and 
seizure is reasonable, police must generally 
obtain prior judicial authorization by way of a 
warrant. In the absence of a warrant, the Crown 
has the onus of establishing that the act of 
search and seizure is reasonable. [para. 21-22]
And further:
The key to the application of the plain view 
doctrine is the principle that s. 8 of the Charter 
protects reasonable expectations of privacy 
against state intrusions. The premise is that a 
person can have no reasonable expectation of 
privacy in an item in plain view to officers 
where the officers have a right to be present 
and are carrying out their lawful duties. 
[references omitted, para. 32]
After examining the origin of the doctrine, the 
Court of Appeal noted the following about the 
application of the plain view doctrine:
• Plain view is a  seizure power limited to items 
that are visible; it is not a power to conduct an 
exploratory search to find evidence of other 
crimes.
• The application of the plain view doctrine 
requires a consideration of the following four 
elements:
“To establish that a state act of search and seizure is reasonable, police must generally 
obtain prior judicial authorization by way of a warrant. In the absence of a warrant, the 
Crown has the onus of establishing that the act of search and seizure is reasonable.”
Charter of Rights
s. 8 Everyone has the right to be 
secure against unreasonable 
search or seizure.
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Lawful Justification: An officer must be 
lawfully in the place and acting lawfully  in 
the exercise of police powers when the 
officer discovers the evidence.
Inadvertent Discovery: The discovery of 
the evidence must be inadvertent. The 
discovery of the evidence need not be a 
surprise in the sense that police did not 
expect to see it. The evidence must not, 
h o w e v e r , b e d i s c o v e r e d b y a n 
unauthorized search. Rather, the police 
could expect to see the evidence but the 
evidence must be in the open when the 
police are lawfully  in the place  where it is 
visible, and lawfully exercising police 
duties. 
Evidence in Plain View: The evidence 
has to be in plain view — detected through 
the unaided use of the officer’s senses;
Immediately Apparent: It must be 
immediately apparent to the officer that 
there  are reasonable and probable grounds 
to believe the item is associated with 
c r imina l ac t iv i t y. The  immediacy 
requirement means that it is apparent 
without further investigations. The officer 
must not take extra investigative steps, such 
as manipulating the item, to firm up 
suspicions of criminality The reasonable 
and probable grounds requirement means 
that more than mere  suspicion is required, 
but not certainty.
• The four element test “is not a mechanical, 
rigid one but an attempt to explain the 
doctrine for what it is, and, importantly, for 
what it  is not. The reason for the  elements is 
to minimize the dangers of the plain view 
doctrine being used as a pretext to get around 
the necessity  of obtaining a warrant. It is not a 
way of allowing the admission of evidence 
o b t a i n e d by p o l i c e c o n d u c t i n g a n 
unauthorized search. It allows evidence to be 
admitted because common sense tells us that 
officers should not simply ignore evidence of 
criminal activity in plain view to them as they 
carry out the lawful exercise of their duties.”
In this case, Justice Griffen found the four criteria 
for the plain view doctrine had been satisfied:
• Lawful Justification  —  the officer was lawfully 
allowed to be where he was  —  executing a 
valid impression warrant  —  when he saw the 
envelope. The police had the right or 
obligation to pick up, move and secure the 
envelope as a personal possession of the 
accused.
• Inadvertent  Discovery —  Not only was the 
discovery of the envelope inadvertent so too 
was the discovery of the evidence inside the 
envelope. The trial judge concluded that the 
officer did not actively take any steps to 
determine what was in the envelope nor did he 
suspect it contained cocaine before the 
contents became visible to him. 
• Evidence in Plain View —  At the time the 
cocaine brick was visible to the officer, after 
moving it to the front passenger seat of the 
police vehicle to secure it as personal property, 
the officer was still acting lawfully. As the  trial 
judge found, in the course of securing the 
envelope, the officer was able to see in the 
envelope, inadvertently, not through a 
deliberate search and the item as in plain view. 
• Immediately Apparent — When the officer saw 
inside the envelope he could see that it 
contained a kilogram of cocaine based on his 
experience dealing with kilogram packages of 
cocaine. He had seen over 30 kilogram bricks 
of cocaine before. Immediately upon seeing 
the item, the officer had reasonable  and 
probable grounds to believe it was a brick  of 
cocaine.
The accused’s appeal was dismissed.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
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Canadian Police and
Peace Officers’ 42nd
Annual Memorial Service
September 29, 2019
Parliament Hill
Ottawa, Ontario
Le 42e service commémoratif
annuel des policiers et des
agents de la paix canadiens
Le 29 septembre 2019
Colline du Parlement
Ottawa (Ontario)
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ADMINISTRATIVE ALCOHOL & 
DRUG RELATED DRIVING 
PROHIBITIONS
B C ’s I m m e d i a t e 
Roadside Prohibition 
(IRP) program was 
introduced in 2010. 
Under this program, 
police may issue a 3, 
7, 30 or 90-day 
prohibition at the 
roadside to alcohol-affected drivers under B.C.’s 
Motor Vehicle Act. 
A police officer will issue an IRP when a driver has 
care or control of a motor vehicle, and following a 
demand to provide a breath sample on an 
Approved Screening Device (ASD): 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.05 (50mg%) BAC (the “Warn” range) 
• if the driver has a blood alcohol concentration 
over 0.08 (80mg%) BAC (the “Fail” range) 
• if the driver fails or refuses to comply with a 
breath test without a reasonable excuse. 
For the 3 or 7 day  IRP, a police officer may decide 
to impound the driver’s vehicle. For 30 or 90 day 
IRP’s, vehicle impoundment is mandatory.  
Administrative Driving Prohibitions
An Administrative Driving Prohibition (ADP) is a 90 
day driving prohibition served on drivers who 
provide a breath test into an approved instrument 
such as an Intoxilyzer. 
If a  driver’s breath sample indicates a BAC above 
0.08 (80mg%), or if the driver refuses to provide a 
sample of breath, police may issue a  90-day 
“Notice of Driving Prohibition” and may also 
charge the driver under the Criminal Code. A driver 
served with an ADP has a 21-day period before the 
prohibition takes effect. 
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
1st incident
3 days
3 days
(officer discretion)
$200
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
2nd incident
within 5 years
7 days
7 days
(officer discretion)
$300
WARN
BAC .05 - .08
3rd incident
within 5 years
30 days
30 days
$400
FAIL
BAC over .08
90 days
30 days
$500
or REFUSE
ASD Result
Incident
IRP Length
Vehicle Impound 
Length
Administrative 
penalty
IMMEDIATE ROADSIDE PROHIBITIONS
Source: Immediate Roadside Prohibition Fact Sheet
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BC’s ALCOHOL DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
Immediate Roadside Prohibitions Administrative Driving Prohibitions
Warn 90 Days 90 Days Total
IRP & 
ADPYEAR 3 day
IRP
7 day
IRP
30 day
IRP
FAIL REFUSE Total
IRP
FAIL REFUSE Total
ADP
2014 5,702 368 25 11,576 1,414 19,085 1,049 352 1,401 20,486
2015 4,670 351 33 9,289 1,863 16,206 1,127 481 1,608 17,814
2016 4,588 334 33 8,864 1,830 15,649 1,127 464 1,591 17,240
2017 4,242 259 19 8,391 1,715 14,626 1,068 420 1,488 16,114
2018 4,742 293 24 9,217 1,711 15,987 1,024 377 1,401 17,388
VEHICLE IMPOUNDMENTS
BC’s Vehicle  Impoundment (VI) Program is a road safety  initiative 
permitting police to immediately impound vehicles operated by drivers 
affected by alcohol. Drivers served with an IRP may see the vehicle they 
were driving impounded for 3, 7 or 30 days, depending  on the 
prohibition length. VI’s may also be issued for prohibited, suspended 
and unlicensed drivers; excessive speeders; stunt drivers and street 
racers; and improperly seated motorcyclists.
BC’s REVIEWS FOR ALCOHOL DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
Immediate Roadside Prohibitions Administrative Driving 
Prohibitions
Warn 90 Days 90 Days
YEAR Reviews Successful % Successful Reviews Successful
% 
Successful Reviews Successful
%
Successful
2014 218 75 34% 2,954 1,114 38% 251 84 33%
2015 158 53 34% 2,757 1,309 47% 335 150 45%
2016 171 32 19% 2,814 861 31% 323 138 43%
2017 158 8 5% 2,635 657 25% 348 134 39%
2018 186 26 14% 2,605 507 19% 306 102 33%
Source: Alcohol Driving Prohibitions
Source: Reviews For Alcohol Prohibitions
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BC VEHICLE IMPOUNDMENTS
TYPE 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018 5 Year Total
BAC - WARN - 3 day VI 2,799 2,305 2,432 2,353 2,805 12,694
BAC - WARN - 7 day VI 258 236 217 223 254 1,188
BAC - WARN - 30 day VI 76 77 43 40 49 285
BAC - FAIL/Refuse - 30 day VI 12,244 10,767 10,304 9,731 10,517 53,563
Prohibited/Suspended - 7 day VI 2,490 2,428 2,211 2,197 2,392 11,718
Prohibited/Suspended - 30 day VI 748 732 664 591 732 3,467
Prohibited/Suspended - 60 day VI 246 206 199 186 245 1,082
Unlicensed - 7 day VI 1,876 1,765 1,526 1,441 1,515 8,123
Unlicensed - 30 day VI 199 156 151 136 140 782
Unlicensed - 60 day VI 47 34 32 31 36 180
Excessive Speed - 7 day VI 6,394 6,871 7,127 5,874 6,202 32,468
Excessive Speed - 30 day VI 296 285 302 240 261 1,384
Excessive Speed - 60 day VI 40 27 24 25 33 149
Race - 7 day VI 73 62 52 43 27 257
Race - 30 day VI 3 2 2 2 3 12
Stunt - 7 day VI 189 192 187 134 142 844
Stunt - 30 day VI 9 8 17 13 9 56
Stunt - 60 day VI 0 0 1 0 0 1
Sitting - 7 day VI 2 0 0 1 0 3
Multiple Reasons - 7 day VI 277 389 1,442 1,699 1,882 5,689
Multiple Reasons - 30 day VI 424 372 515 495 569 2,375
Multiple Reasons - 60 day VI 21 21 49 61 72 224
TOTAL 28,711 26,935 27,497 25,516 27,885 136,544
Source: Vehicle Impoundments
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24 Hour Prohibitions
A police officer in BC may serve  a driver with a 24-
hour driving prohibition if the  officer has 
reasonable grounds that the driver’s ability to drive 
a motor vehicle is affected by a  drug or alcohol. 
The driver is then automatically prohibited from 
driving a motor vehicle for a period of 24 hours 
(see s. 215 of BC’s Motor Vehicle Act).
Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle Fatalities
RoadSafetyBC has released a report on acohol-
related motor vehicle (MV) fatalities. The report 
suggests that there  was an immediate and sustained 
reduction in alcohol-related motor vehicle fatalities 
since the  IRP program was implemented. in 
September 2010. 
“In the final three months of 2010, the MV 
fatalities related to alcohol for the province were 
reduced by 58%, from an average  of 26 to 11,” 
noted the report. “In the first full calendar year of 
the program, alcohol related MV fatalities dropped 
from 113 to 68, a 40% reduction. This reduction 
has continued from 2012 through 2018 with there 
being 50% fewer alcohol-related fatalities since 
the introduction of the IRP.”
Source: Report on Alcohol-Related Motor Vehicle (MV) Fatalities
24-HOUR DRIVING PROHIBITIONS
YEAR Alcohol Drug Total % Drug
2014 3,460 3,080 6,540 47%
2015 3,430 2,640 6,070 43%
2016 3,310 2,600 5,910 44%
2017 3,001 2,435 5,436 45%
2018 2,830 2,610 5,440 48%
5 Year
Total 16,031 13,365 29,396 45%
Source: Alcohol Driving Prohibitions
Fatal Victims in Crashes where Alcohol was Deemed a Contributing Factor
Year 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010 2011 2012 2013 2014 2015 2016 2017 2018
Fatal 
Victims 103 129 114 128 102 92 111 68 49 52 59 61 52 64 51
There were 100 fatal victims from January - September 2010 and 11 from October - December 2010.
The IRP program was implemented on September 20, 2010.
ACCIDENTAL ATV DEATHS
The BC Coroners Service released a report in July 2019 summarizing all accidental 
all-terrain vehicle (ATV) and utility task vehicle (UTV, side-by-side) deaths in BC. In 
the last 10 years (2009 - 2018) there were 127 accidental ATV deaths. Males 
accounted for 107 (84%) of decedents while females accounted for 20 (16%). 
More than one-third (39.7%) of decedents were injured in the summer months and 
data from 2009 - 2017 suggest that alcohol and/or drug involvement was identified 
as a contributing factor in half (50.9%) of the deaths. Source: Accidental ATV Deaths 2009-2018
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2018 POLICE REPORTED CRIME
In July 2019, Statistics Canada 
released its “Police-reported 
crime statistics in Canada, 
2018” report. Highlights of this 
recent collection of crime data 
include:
• There were 2,033,925 crimes (excluding traffic) 
reported to Canadian police in 2018; this 
represents 69,796 more crimes reported when 
compared to 2017.
• The total crime rate  increased +2%. This includes 
a violent crime rate  rise of +3% and a property 
crime rate rise of +2%.
YK
T-170.3
V-208.7
NV-156.2
T=Total Crime Severity Index
V=Violent Crime Severity Index
NV=Non-Violent Crime Severity Index
SK
T-139.2 
V-138.1
NV-139.2
AB
T-112.1
V-97.1
NV-117.2
BC
T-87.7
V-73.4
NV-92.6
QC
T-56.6
V-71.8
NV-51.0
ON
T-60.0
V-73.4
NV-55.0
MB
T-125.8
V-169.8
NV-109.6
NWT
T-324.4
V-421.6
NV-288.7
NU
T-319.9
V-550.5
NV-236.2
NB
T-71.8
V-76.1
NV-70.1
NF
T-65.9
V-70.2
NV-64.2
NS
T-65.2
V-78.2
NV-60.4
PEI
T-53.7
V-48.1
NV-55.6
Police-Reported Crime Severity Indexes
Police-Reported Impaired Driving Offences
Province Rate Impaired Driving 
Offences
Rate change 
2017 to 2018
SK 531 6,167 -1%
PEI 417 639 +47%
AB 286 12,312 +4%
NS 282 2,709 +5%
NF 250 1,315 -6%
MB 248 3,347 -9%
BC 240 11,961 +6%
NB 238 1,834 +1%
QC 166 13,909 -2%
ON 99 14,217 -3%
The Crime Severity Index (CSI) is another measure of police-reported crime. 
Each offence is assigned a weight, derived from sentences handed down by 
criminal courts. The more serious the average sentence, the higher the offence is 
weighted. The weighted offences are then summed and divided by the population. 
An overall CSI has been created as well as a violent CSI and non-violent CSI.
Source: Statistics Canada, 2019, “Police-reported crime statistics in 
Canada, 2018, Catalogue no. 85-002-X,released on July 22, 2019.
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YK
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MB
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42,303
+3%
QC
3,304
-3%
ON
4,113
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NF
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PEI
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+1%
NB
5,301
+3%
NS
5,075
0%
Police-Reported Crime Rates per 100,000 population
Canada’s Top Ten Reported Crimes
Offence Number
Theft of $5,000 or less (non-motor vehicle) 406,379
Mischief 226,864
Administration of Justice Violations 226,864
Assault-level 1 169,364
Break and Enter 159,812
Shoplifting under $5,000 124,933
Disturb the Peace 94,378
Theft of Motor Vehicle 86,132
Uttering Threats 66,508
Assault-level 2 53,779
Homicide
There were 651 homicides reported, 15 fewer than 
the previous year. Ontario had the most homicides 
at 266, followed by British Columbia (89), Quebec 
(83) and Alberta (81). PEI reported no homicides 
while Newfoundland reported two (2) homicides 
followed by the Yukon with three (3). As for 
provincial or territorial homicide rates, Nunavut had 
the highest rate (20.84 per 100,000 population) 
followed by the Northwest Territories (13.47), the 
Yukon (7.41), Manitoba (4.07), Saskatchewan (2.93) 
and Alberta (1.88). As for Census Metropolitan Areas 
(CMA’s), Thunder Bay, ON had the highest homicide 
rate at 6.38. The Canadian homicide rate was 1.76.
Canada
5,488
+2%
Top CMA Homicide Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Thunder Bay, ON 6.38 Winnipeg, MB 2.69
Brantford, ON 3.36 Edmonton, AB 2.60
Regina, SK 3.10 Saskatoon, SK 2.44
Abbotsford-Mission, BC 3.07 Toronto, ON 2.26
Windsor, ON 2.86 Sherbrooke, QC 1.96
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Robbery
In 2018 there were 22,450 robberies 
reported, resulting in a national rate of 61 
robberies per 100,000 population. Manitoba 
had the  highest robbery rate  followed by 
Saskatchewan and the Northwest Territories.
• Winnipeg, MB had the highest CMA rate for 
robbery in Canada (290), up +11% from 2017 
rate. Saguenay, QC & Quebec City, QC both had 
the lowest rate  (18). Sherbrooke, QC reported a 
jump of 44% in its robbery  rate. Trois-Rivieres, 
QC (+32%), Belleville, ON (+31%), Moncton, 
NB (+27%) and Regina, SK (+26%) also saw high 
double digit increases above 25%. 
• Five CMAs reported declines of robbery of more 
than 20%: Peterborough, ON, ( -54% ) , 
Lethbridge, AB (-23%), Hamilton, ON (-23%), 
Quebec City, QC (-22%), & Windsor, ON 
(-21%). 
Break and Enter
In 2018 there were 159,812 break-
ins reported to police. The national 
break-in rate was 431 break-ins per 
100,000 people. Nunavut had the 
highest break- in rate (1,261 ) 
followed by the Northwest Territories 
(1,004). 
Police-Reported Robberies
Province/ 
Territory
Rate Robberies Rate change 
2017 to 2018
MB 197 2,663 +11%
SK 85 984 -5%
NWT 83 37 +24%
AB 80 3,467 +5%
ON 62 8,814 -7%
BC 49 2,470 -2%
NF 41 214 +16%
QC 39 3,233 -12%
YK 37 15 +22%
NU 34 13 -15%
NS 33 312 0%
NB 27 207 -2%
PEI 14 21 +15%
CANADA 61 22,450 -3%
Top Ten CMA Robbery Rates per 100,000
CMA Rate CMA Rate
Winnipeg, MB 290 Calgary, AB 88
Thunder Bay, ON 156 Toronto, ON 85
Saskatoon, SK 108 Hamilton, ON 69
Edmonton, AB 108 Ottawa, ON 60
Regina, SK 106 Vancouver, BC 60
Police-Reported Break-ins
Province/
Territory
Rate Break-ins Rate change 
2017 to 2018
NU 1,261 484 -19%
NWT 1,004 447 -2%
SK 867 10,080 +2%
MB 753 10,184 +4%
AB 738 31,807 +2%
BC 524 26,161 -3%
YK 506 205 +5%
NB 451 3,475 -5%
NF 380 1,998 -6%
ON 319 45,736 +6%
QC 311 26,110 -15%
NS 281 2,701 -4%
PEI 277 424 +21%
CANADA 431 159,812 -1%
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CSI  VALUE
CHANGE IN CSI  2017 TO 2018
IN 2018, SEVEN PROVINCES AND TERRITORIES REPORTED 
A HIGHER CSI AND FOUR REPORTED A DECREASE.
CRIMES AFFECTING THE CSI 
INCLUDE:
651 VICTIMS
 OF HOMICIDE IN 
CANADA,
15 FEWER THAN IN 2017
The Crime Severity Index (CSI)1 was 2% higher than in 2017, marking the 4th consecutive increase after 
11 years of declines. The rise in Canada’s CSI in 2018 was the result of increases in numerous offences, most 
notably, fraud, sexual assault (level 1), shoplifting of $5,000 and under, and theft over $5,000.
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After two years of discussion around 
sexual misconduct and unfounded
sexual assaults, the police-reported rate 
of sexual assault continued to increase.
Police reported
 
opioid offences 
(excluding heroin) in 2018.
Rate of extortion in Canada 
up     13% 2,490 
The rate of methamphetamine 
offences grew by 44% 
in 2018, continuing the 
rise since 2012.
+15%
sexual assault
11% CLASSIFIED AS 
UNFOUNDED2 IN 2018 
COMPARED TO 14% IN 2017
POLICE-REPORTED 
CRIMEIN CANADA,2018 POLICE
www.statcan.gc.ca
1. While the crime rate measures the volume of criminal violations, the Crime Severity Index (CSI) is a measure of both the volume and severity of police-reported crime. To determine the severity of a crime, all crimes are assigned a weight based on actual 
sentences handed down by the courts in all provinces and territories. More serious crimes are assigned higher weights, while less serious crimes are assigned lower weights. As a result, more serious offences have a greater impact on changes in the index. 
2. An incident is ‘unfounded’ if it has been determined through police investigation that the offence reported did not occur, nor was it attempted.
3. Total homicide victims excludes persons where the Indigenous identity was reported as unknown by police ( less than 1% of victims in 2018). Rates as calculated per 100,000 Indigenous population by sex, and 
per 100,000 non-Indigenous population by sex. 
Source: Statistics Canada Canadian Centre for Justice Statistics, Uniform Crime Reporting Survey and Homicide Survey.
“Police-reported crime statistics in Canada, 2018.” Juristat. Statistics Canada Catalogue no. 85-002-X.
Catalogue number: 11-627-M
ISBN: 978-0-660-31868-4
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2019 BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL SERVICE
Parade participants to form up at 12:00 noon in the 
800 block of Government Street, Victoria, BC.
Parade will step off at 12:40 pm
OTHER WEEKEND EVENTS
6TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT 
MEMORIAL GOLF TOURNAMENT
Date: Friday, September 27, 2019
Format: Texas Scramble
Time: 11:00 am Registration / 1:00 pm Shotgun Start
Location: Bear Mountain Golf & Country Club, 1999 Country Club Way, Victoria, BC
6TH ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RIDE TO 
REMEMBER
Date: Saturday, September 28, 2019
1ST ANNUAL BC LAW ENFORCEMENT MEMORIAL RUN TO 
REMEMBER
Date: Saturday, September 28, 2019
BCLEM MEET & GREET
Date: Saturday, September 28, 2019
click here for more info
Sunday, September 29, 2019 at 1:00 pm 
BC Legislature, Victoria, BC
Volume 19 Issue 4 ~ July/August 2019
PAGE 31
RCMP STRENGTH
The RCMP is Canada’s largest police 
organization. It is divided into 15 
Divisions with Headquarters in 
Ottawa. Each division is managed 
by a commanding officer and is 
designated alphabetically. 
RCMP On-Strength Establishment  
Rank # of positions
Jan. 1, 2018 Apr. 1, 2019 Change
Commissioner 1 1 -
Deputy Commissioners 5 6 +1
Assistant Commissioners 28 33 +5
Chief Superintendents 57 55 -2
Superintendents 187 186 -1
Inspectors 322 331 +9
Corps Sergeant Major 1 1 -
Sergeants Major 8 8 -
Staff Sergeants Major 9 10 +1
Staff Sergeants 838 828 -10
Sergeants 2,018 2,037 +19
Corporals 3,599 3,565 -34
Constables 11,913 11,859 -54
Special Constables 112 116 +4
Civilian Members 3,403 3,445 +42
Public Service Employees 7,695 7,646 -49
Total 30,196 30,127 -69
Source: http://www.rcmp-grc.gc.ca/about-ausujet/organi-eng.htm
RCMP DIVISIONS
Division Area
Depot Regina, SK (Training Academy)
National National Capital Region
B Newfoundland & Labrador
C Quebec
D Manitoba
E British Columbia
F Saskatchewan
G Northwest Territories
H Nova Scotia
J New Brunswick
K Alberta
L Prince Edward Island
M Yukon Territory
O Ontario
V Nunavut Territory
TORONTO SHOOTINGS
As of August 25, 2019, the Toronto Police 
Service reported there  were 285 shootings 
so far in 2019 involving 430  victims 
including 24 deaths. The 2019 occurrence 
numbers represent a 5%  increase over last 
year while the victim count is up 18%.
Source: Shootings YTD [accessed August 27, 2019] Jan Feb Mar Apr May Jun Jul to Aug 25
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NON-COMPLIANCE WITH       
s. 495(2) DID NOT RENDER 
ARREST UNLAWFUL
R. v. Jowett Work, 2019 BCCA 236
After being dispatched to investigate 
the theft of a  wallet, police officers 
received descriptions of two suspects 
and then met with the  complainants, 
who told them that a black wallet 
with a red band was taken from a pocket when 
they were standing at the counter of a  McDonald’s 
restaurant. The suspects had fled. The complainants 
described two suspects, a male in his 20s wearing  a 
grey coat or sweater and glasses, and a female 
wearing pink clothes, skinny pants with her hair in 
a bun.
The officers contacted a security guard at 
McDonald’s and reviewed a surveillance video that 
had recorded the theft. One of the officers observed 
in the video that the male was carrying a  backpack 
with a blue stripe. About 20 minutes after leaving 
McDonald’s, the security guard contacted the 
officers and advised them that he had seen the two 
suspects walking on a  street. The officers drove to 
the location, observed the suspects, and arrested 
them. 
After the arrest, the  accused was searched for the 
missing wallet, as well as any weapons or means of 
escape. In searching the accused’s pockets, police 
found three  cell phones, numerous baggies, and 
rocks of crack  cocaine. He was then arrested for 
possession for the purpose of trafficking. Police  also 
searched the accused’s backpack and found further 
items related to the drug charges.
British Columbia Supreme Court
The judge concluded that the s. 495(2) 
of the Criminal Code rendered the 
accused’s arrest unlawful. “There is no 
evidence of whether the  arresting 
officers believed on reasonable grounds that the 
public interest, having regard to all of the 
circumstances including the need to establish the 
identity of the person, secure or preserve evidence 
of or relating to the offence, or prevent the 
continuation or repetition of the offence or the 
commission of another offence, may not have been 
satisfied without arresting the accused,”  said the 
judge. “Further there is no evidence that the 
arresting officers had reasonable grounds to 
believe that if they  did not arrest the accused he 
would fail to attend court in order to be dealt with 
according to the law.”
The search incidental to the unlawful arrest was 
also unreasonable. The police breached both ss. 8 
and 9 of the Charter and the evidence was 
excluded under s. 24(2). The judge then dismissed 
the charges against the accused. 
British Columbia Court of Appeal
The Crown argued that the 
trial judge erred, in part, by 
failing to apply the correct 
legal test when determining 
the validity of the arrest and in failing to consider 
the effect of s.  495(3) of the Criminal Code. The 
Crown wanted a new trial
Arrest
Section 495(1)(a) permits a peace officer to arrest 
without warrant “a person who has committed an 
indictable offence or who, on reasonable grounds, 
he believes has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence.” This provision “requires that 
the arresting officer subjectively  believe there are 
reasonable and probable  grounds to arrest, and 
that those grounds are objectively reasonable.” 
Section  495(2) was enacted “to prevent the 
unnecessary  arrest of persons charged with certain 
kinds of offences where the public interest does 
not require an arrest. It imposes a further duty  on 
a police officer not to arrest a person without 
warrant for a hybrid offence where the officer 
‘believes on reasonable grounds’ that the public 
interest may be satisfied without an arrest, for the 
reasons set out in ss.  495(2)(d)(i), (ii) or (iii) and 
(e).”
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The accused was initially arrested for theft (s. 334 
of the Criminal Code). Theft over $5,000 is an 
indictable offence while theft under $5,000 is a 
hybrid offence, which is deemed to be indictable 
by virtue of the Interpretation Act. 
In this case, the trial judge erred in considering 
only  s. 495(2) and not whether the arresting  officer 
had reasonable grounds under s. 495(1)(a) to make 
the arrest. The trial judge was required to determine 
if the Crown had established that the officers had 
reasonable grounds to arrest the accused under 
s. 495(1)(a). Justice Fisher stated:
[T]here was no need to consider s.  495(2), as 
any noncompliance with s.  495(2) would not, 
in a criminal proceeding, render an otherwise 
lawful arrest unlawful, in light of the deeming 
provision in s. 495(3)(a).” 
Section 495(3) deems a peace officer to be 
acting lawfully and in the execution of his duty, 
even if the officer has failed to comply with 
s. 495(2) ... 
The effect of this provision is that a police 
officer still acts lawfully and the arrest is lawful 
as long as the Crown establishes that the officer 
had reasonable and probable grounds to arrest 
under s.  495(1)(a) or (b). Subsection  (3)(b) 
provides an exception to this deeming 
provision only in a non-criminal context [as in 
a civil case] where noncompliance with 
s.  495(2) is established by a plaintiff or 
applicant.
It appears that the genesis of s.  495(3) was to 
foreclose the right to raise a defence in criminal 
proceedings to charges such as resisting lawful 
arrest due to noncompliance with s. 495(2). .... 
[references omitted, paras. 30-3]
And further:
[I]t is my view that an arrest that is lawful under 
s.  495(1) cannot be rendered unlawful in a 
criminal proceeding due only to a peace 
officer’s failure to properly consider the public 
interest in an arrest as set out in s.  495(2) ... 
[para. 39]
BY THE BOOK:
s. 495 Criminal Code - Arrest Without Warrant
Arrest without warrant by peace officer
s. 495  (1)  A peace officer may arrest without 
warrant
(a)  a person who has committed an indictable 
offence or who, on reasonable grounds, he 
believes has committed or is about to commit an 
indictable offence;
(b) a person whom he finds committing a criminal offence; 
or
(c) a person in respect of whom he has reasonable grounds 
to believe that a warrant of arrest or committal, in any 
form set out in Part XXVIII in relation thereto, is in 
force within the territorial jurisdiction in which the 
person is found.
Limitation
(2) A peace officer shall not arrest a person without warrant 
for
(a) an indictable offence mentioned in section 553,
(b) an offence for which the person may be prosecuted by 
indictment or for which he is punishable on summary 
conviction, or
(c) an offence punishable on summary conviction,
in any case where
(d)  he believes on reasonable grounds that the public 
interest, having regard to all the circumstances including 
the need to
(i) establish the identity of the person,
(ii)  secure or preserve evidence of or relating to the 
offence, or
(iii) prevent the continuation or repetition of the offence 
or the commission of another offence,
may be satisfied without so arresting the person, and
(e) he has no reasonable grounds to believe that, if he does 
not so arrest the person, the person will fail to attend 
court in order to be dealt with according to law.
Consequences of arrest without warrant
(3)  Notwithstanding subsection (2), a peace officer acting 
under subsection (1) is deemed to be acting lawfully and in the 
execution of his duty for the purposes of
(a)  any proceedings under this or any other Act of 
Parliament; and
(b) any other proceedings, unless in any such proceedings 
it is alleged and established by the person making the 
allegation that the peace officer did not comply with the 
requirements of subsection (2).
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Here, the trial judge erred in concluding that the 
arrest of the  accused was unlawful by considering 
only  the requirements of s. 495(2) in isolation from 
both ss. 495(1) and (3).
The Crown’s Appeal was allowed and a new trial 
was ordered.
Complete case available at www.courts.gov.bc.ca
ABSENCE OF SUBJECTIVE 
GROUNDS FATAL TO SEARCH 
LEGALITY
R. v. Lai, 2019 ONCA 420
Based on information received about 
the sounds of a domestic disturbance 
in an apartment unit, police attended 
to investigate. When police arrived at 
the apartment unit, they knocked on 
the door. One of the accused partially opened the 
door. As a result of a one to two minute-long 
interaction with the accused at the door, along with 
the information previously received, an officer 
entered and searched the apartment.
Although he did not find anyone in need of 
assistance, the officer saw cash and drugs. A search 
warrant was obtained which led to the seizure of 
about three  kilograms of marijuana, 35 grams of 
cocaine, 140 MDMA methamphetamine capsules, 
and $36,000 cash. Both accused were charged 
with possessing controlled substances for the 
purposes of trafficking and possessing proceeds of 
crime.
Ontario Court of Justice
The officer who entered and searched 
the apartment testified he did not smell 
an odour of marihuana until he stepped 
into the apartment. A second officer 
said he could smell a strong odour of marihuana as 
soon as the door was opened a crack. The judge 
inferred that the searching officer must also have 
smelled marihuana immediately and that he was 
not accurately relating when he smelled marihuana 
to strengthen his grounds for entry. The searching 
officer also said he would have “gotten a landlord 
with a key”, thus delaying entry, if no-one had 
answered the door. This readiness to delay entry, in 
the judge’s view, was inconsistent with a belief that 
there  was an exigent need to enter to protect the 
life and safety of any occupants. 
The judge concluded that the police had ample 
grounds to attend the apartment to investigate and 
objective grounds to enter the apartment under 
their common law authority based on an exigent 
basis to verify the safety of anyone who may be 
inside. However, this was not the  reason why the 
searching officer entered. He found the searching 
officer did not have  the subjective grounds he 
claimed in his testimony. The judge held the 
warrantless search to be unconstitutional and a s. 8 
Charter breach, but that the evidence was 
admissible  under s. 24(2). Although the officer did 
not have the necessary subjective belief, which the 
trial judge held was “serious Charter infringing 
State conduct” and favoured exclusion, the 
reliability of the evidence on serious charges and 
the existence of objective grounds, which mitigated 
the impact of the breach on the Charter-protected 
interests of the accused, favoured inclusion. Both 
accused were  convicted on three counts of 
possessing drugs for the purpose of trafficking and 
possessing proceeds of crime.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in failing to 
cons ide r t he s ea rch ing 
officer’s misleading testimony 
in his s. 24(2) analysis and gave  undue emphasis to 
the objective grounds for the search.
Misleading Testimony
The Ontario Court of Appeal held that “a finding 
that an officer intentionally attempted to mislead a 
court about a  constitutional violation that has 
occurred is an important pro-exclusionary 
consideration in an s. 24(2) application.” Here, the 
trial judge gave no consideration to the searching 
officer’s misleading testimony in admitting  the 
evidence under s. 24(2). In not considering the 
searching officer’s misleading subjective-belief 
testimony, the trial judge erred.
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Objective Grounds
Th e A p p e a l C o u r t 
concluded that the  trial 
judge was wrong to find 
that the  Charter breach 
had little  impact on the 
C h a r t e r - p r o t e c t e d 
interests of the accused 
because “the public 
does not have the right or reasonable expectation 
to be free from a search even of a dwelling where 
objective reasonable serious public safety grounds 
exist”. First, “a person with a  reasonable 
expectation of privacy  in a place has the 
constitutional right to be free from an illegal 
search,”  said the Court of Appeal. “A search 
without subjective grounds is illegal, even where 
objective grounds would have existed had the 
officer acted on those grounds.” Second, “the 
extent to which the breach undermines the 
substantial privacy interest in a dwelling house 
does not vary depending upon whether, in spite of 
the breach, objective grounds existed,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “A court cannot justify a search 
based on the existence of objective  grounds for a 
form of search that was not undertaken. ... It is 
improper to diminish the seriousness or impact of 
an illegal search because the searching officer 
would have had objective grounds had he 
conducted a different kind of search.”
s. 24(2) Charter
Since the trial judge did not consider the searching 
officer’s misleading testimony on the repute of the 
administration of justice and trivialized the 
important subjective component of the reasonable 
grounds standard, the Appeal Court conducted its 
own s. 24(2) analysis.
Although the reliable evidence was crucial to the 
Crown’s case which favoured admission, the 
Charter-breach was serious. The police conducted a 
search without the required subjective grounds. 
And the searching officer’s misleading evidence 
significantly aggravated the seriousness of the 
breach. Finally, the impact of the search on the 
Charter-protected interests of the accused was 
considerable. The police entered their dwelling 
house illegally, violating their  privacy interests. The 
evidence obtained during the initial search as well 
as the subsequent search with a warrant was 
excluded.
The accuseds’ appeal was allowed, their 
convictions were set aside, and acquittals on all of 
the charges were substituted.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE MUST HAVE ROAD 
SAFETY IN MIND WHEN USING 
PROVINCIAL STOP POWERS
R. v. Mayor, 2019 ONCA 578
After receiving  an anonymous tip that 
the accused was dealing drugs from 
his car, a  police High Enforcement 
Action Team (HEAT) began an 
investigation. In the course of the 
investigation, a HEAT officer learned that the 
accused’s driver’s licence was suspended. The 
officer also conducted surveillance on the accused 
on four occasions without observing any signs of 
drug trafficking. 
The officer, along with another HEAT member, 
subsequently stopped the  accused and arrested him 
for driving with a suspended licence. After 
observing  signs of impairment, the  accused was 
also arrested for impaired driving. Another officer 
searched the vehicle and found cocaine, cell 
phones, and drug-related paraphernalia. The 
accused was then charged with possessing cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking.
“A search without subjective grounds is illegal, even where objective grounds would have 
existed had the officer acted on those grounds.” 
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Ontario Superior Court of Justice
The accused asserted that his arrest was 
unlawful and sought the exclusion of 
the evidence. In his view, the  police had 
stopped and arrested him for an 
improper purpose - to search his vehicle for 
evidence of drug trafficking. The judge, however, 
concluded that the accused’s arrest was lawful. 
Although the drug investigation led nowhere, the 
police were entitled to investigate  the accused for 
suspended driving. The  police  had a valid purpose 
for the stop under the Highway Traffic Act (HTA) 
and arrested the  accused for driving while 
suspended. The search was a valid inventory. There 
were no breaches of ss. 8 or 9 of the Charter. The 
accused was convicted of possessing cocaine for 
the purpose of trafficking.
Ontario Court of Appeal 
The accused challenged his 
conviction contending  that 
the tr ial judge erred in 
concluding his arrest was 
lawful and the  subsequent search of his vehicle was 
reasonable. He suggested, in part, that the trial 
judge did not apply  the proper test when he 
concluded that the police had the authority to 
arrest him under the HTA, rather than determining 
whether they used this authority  as a ruse to further 
their drug investigation.  
Vehicle Stops
The Court of Appeal described the law as it related 
to vehicle stops under statute as follows:
The Ontario Legislature has given the police 
broad powers to stop motor vehicles for 
highway regulation and safety purposes, and, in 
some circumstances, to arrest drivers of motor 
vehicles. Section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic 
Act gives an officer the power to stop a vehicle, 
even if the stop is random and the officer lacks 
reasonable and probable grounds or even 
reasonable suspicion. ... Likewise, s. 217(2) of 
the Highway Traffic Act authorizes an officer to 
make a warrantless arrest of a person who the 
officer believes on reasonable and probable 
grounds to be driving while suspended. If the 
officer is satisfied that a person is driving while 
suspended, the officer also has the duty to 
detain and impound the vehicle: Highway 
Traffic Act, s. 55.2(1).
However, the existence of these powers does 
not automatically make motor vehicle stops 
lawful because the police are not free to use 
these powers for some other purpose, including 
to further a criminal investigation. The 
Legislature granted the police these powers for 
the purpose of ensuring road safety. The court 
must ensure that the police use these powers in 
a manner consistent with this purpose. As a 
result, if the police do not have road safety 
purposes subjectively in mind, they cannot rely 
on the Highway Traffic Act powers to authorize 
the stop. If the police cannot point to any other 
legal authority for the stop, the stop will not be 
authorized by law and so will violate s. 9 of the 
Charter. The court must thus determine whether 
the officer actually formed a “legitimate 
intention” to make the detention or arrest for 
road safety purposes.
A detention or arrest pursuant to a Highway 
Traffic Act power can be lawful if the officer 
has either only road safety purposes in mind or 
has both road safety and other legitimate 
purposes in mind. .... The investigation of 
criminal activity is one such legitimate 
“Section 216(1) of the Highway Traffic Act gives an officer the power to stop a vehicle, 
even if the stop is random and the officer lacks reasonable and probable grounds or 
even reasonable suspicion.”
“A detention or arrest pursuant to a Highway Traffic Act power can be lawful if the 
officer has either only road safety purposes in mind or has both road safety and other 
legitimate purposes in mind.”
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purpose. ... In many cases it will be unhelpful 
to take an either/or approach to whether a stop 
is for road safety or some other legitimate 
purpose. An officer may thus have a road safety 
purpose in mind even i f the of f icer 
simultaneously has a criminal law purpose in 
mind.
However, if the officer does not have a 
legitimate road safety purpose in mind and is 
using the Highway Traffic Act authority as a 
mere ruse or pretext to stop a vehicle in order 
to investigate a crime, then the detention will 
be unlawful. ... .
Consequently, the court must make a factual 
determination as to whether the officer had a 
road safety purpose in mind or whether the 
officer was using the Highway Traffic Act power 
as a ruse to conduct a criminal investigation. In 
determining the police purpose, the court must 
consider all the circumstances, including the 
evidence of the officers, the evidence of the 
detained person, the circumstances of the stop, 
and the police conduct during the stop. 
[references omitted, paras. 6-10]
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge did not 
determine whether the police used the HTA for a 
road safety purpose or as a ruse to search the 
accused’s vehicle as part of a drug  investigation. 
Rather than treating the existence of the power to 
arrest the accused for suspended driving under the 
HTA as dispositive, the trial judge was required to 
“determine whether the officers subjectively 
formed an intention to arrest the [accused] for the 
road safety purpose  that motivates the s. 217(2) 
grant of authority to police,” said the Appeal 
Court. “If the officers did not subjectively form 
this intention, then their reliance on s. 217(2) was 
a ruse and s. 217(2) could not authorize the 
arrest.”
While not addressing the  merits of the accused’s 
position on the pre-textual nature of the stop or 
whether the purpose was to investigate the accused 
for driving with a suspended licence, the Court of 
Appeal sent the matter back for a  retrial before a 
different judge to consider all of the circumstances 
in determining the legality of the accused’s arrest, 
and whether the traffic stop was a pretext to further 
a drug investigation. In doing so, the  Court of 
Appeal comments as follows:
Without expressing any view on the merits of 
the application, we note that the evidence 
included not only the officers’ explanations for 
the stop, but also all of the surrounding 
circumstances. These included the fact that the 
[accused] was stopped by the same members of 
a specialized, plainclothes police unit who had 
been investigating him, without success, for a 
drug offence; that he had been placed under 
surveillance at midnight; that the officers 
disagreed about whether they set out to 
investigate the [accused] for driving while 
suspended, or whether they decided to do so 
because it was a “slow night”; that the notes of 
one of the officers included a reference to the 
drug investigation; and that the police 
inventory of the contents of the vehicle listed 
o n l y d r u g s , c e l l p h o n e s a n d d r u g 
paraphernalia. [para. 15]
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his conviction 
was set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
POLICE ARREST DECISION 
INFLUENCED IN ANY WAY BY 
RACIAL PROFILING RENDERS 
DETENTION ARBITRARY
R. v. Dudhi, 2019 ONCA 665
A police officer was conducting 
u n d e r c o v e r s u r v e i l l a n c e i n 
connection with a drug investigation. 
A blue BMW being driven by a white 
male was a vehicle of interest. A 
“[I]f the officer does not have a legitimate road safety purpose in mind and is using the 
Highway Traffic Act authority as a mere ruse or pretext to stop a vehicle in order to 
investigate a crime, then the detention will be unlawful.”
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police officer saw a BMW of the same colour and 
model and followed it. The BMW pulled into a strip 
mall parking lot. The officer then noticed the 
vehicle was not being driven by the white suspect 
but by a black man (the accused). The officer called 
off an earlier request he made for a  license plate 
verification of the targeted vehicle, saying on the 
police radio, “Disregard. It’s the wrong guy here.”
The officer asked the accused’s plate to be queried. 
He said he believed that the  accused had been 
engaging in some counter-surveillance. The 
accused got out of his car and was walking and 
waiting, and using a  cell phone. The officer learned 
the registered owner was subject to bail conditions, 
which included a term that he was not to be in 
possession of a  cell phone. At the same time, the 
officer learned there were more conditions on file 
but a records clerk would need to look at the file to 
get them. Before  a  records clerk could pull the file 
to check all of the recognizance conditions, the 
officer decided to arrest the accused. 
The accused exited the car and walked around, 
entered the back seat of a Mercedes SUV, then 
returned to his BMW and drove away. The officer 
suspected a drug deal. The officer followed the 
accused and was asked on the radio whether it was 
the target of their ongoing investigation. The officer 
responded, “No, it’s another brown guy who 
is a drug dealer”. The police then boxed in the 
BMW at an intersection and arrested the accused 
for failing to comply with the conditions of his 
release because he had a cellphone. (As it turned 
out, a variation to the recognizance had removed 
the cellphone prohibition relied upon for the 
arrest). The accused immediately indicated that his 
“no cellphone” release condition had been varied. 
The officers then noticed that, in addition to the 
cellphone he had in his hand, there was another 
cellphone in the centre console of the vehicle. 
Despite eventually producing a  judicial interim 
release order which allowed him to possess a  single 
cell phone, officers continued the arrest.
The accused and his vehicle were searched as an 
incident to arrest for further evidence of breaching 
a recognizance. In a  recessed well under the loose 
plastic cover of the rear seat fold down armrest, 
police found a concealed compartment with a 
finger hole that permitted opening. Inside was 
497.32 grams of cocaine. The accused was charged 
with possessing cocaine for the purpose of 
trafficking, and two counts of breach of 
recognizance, violating the no cellphone condition 
and for not abstaining from possessing narcotics.
Ontario Superior Court
The police denied that they were 
conducting  a drug search and that the 
search was conducted incidental to the 
accused’s arrest for breaching the no 
cellphone condition on his recognizance. The 
officer testified race played no part in the 
investigation, arrest, or search, despite the 
comment he made about “another brown guy who 
is a drug dealer.” The officer claimed that his 
comment simply meant that this was another drug 
dealer, other than the initial surveillance target, and 
that this person was a brown male.
The accused submitted that he was arbitrarily 
arrested contrary  to s. 9 of the Charter. First, he said 
his arrest for breaching the no cellphone condition 
was precipitous. The arresting officer knew that 
there  were release conditions on the accused’s 
electronic file and a review of those additional 
“Police have the power to detain a suspect under the common law power of investigative 
detention if they reasonably suspect that the suspect is committing, or has recently 
committed a crime. The reasonableness of the suspicion must be assessed on an 
objective view of the totality of the circumstances. The reasonable suspicion test is a low 
threshold, since the officer’s information need only objectively indicate a possibility that a 
suspect is committing a crime, not a probability.”
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conditions might have revealed he was no longer 
subject to a cellphone prohibition. The decision to 
proceed with his arrest, without confirming that the 
condition justifying the arrest was still in force, was 
therefore arbitrary. Second, the accused suggested 
that the arresting officer engaged in racial profiling 
as evidenced by his comment, “it’s another brown 
guy who is a drug dealer”. As for the  search, the 
accused contended that the officers conducted a 
pretence search, that they were searching his 
vehicle for narcotics under the pretence that they 
were searching incidental to his arrest for breaching 
the no cellphone condition. This, in his view, 
breached s. 8.
The judge found the accused’s arrest was arbitrary 
because  it was not objectively reasonable. The 
police  had proceeded with the arrest on 
incomplete  information. In his view, the officer had 
a reason and the means to inquire into whether the 
recognizance condition prohibiting possession of a 
cellphone was still in force. 
The comment, “another brown guy who is a drug 
dealer”, was troubling to the judge. He found it did 
not reflect well on the officer and his explanation 
for it was “not convincing”. However, there was no 
link between the comment and the reason for the 
arrest. The comment was made after the officer 
believed he had grounds to arrest and did not 
contribute to his decision for the arrest. “It did not 
inspire any precipitous or improper action,”  said 
the judge. As for the search, the judge found it was 
lawful as an incident to the breach of recognizance 
arrest. “A search of the interior of the vehicle for 
the presence of other cellphones within the reach 
of the driver was justified,” said the judge.
Despite the  s. 9 Charter breach, the judge admitted 
the evidence under s. 24(2). The police failure to 
look deeper into the status of the accused’s release 
conditions was not a deliberate effort to circumvent 
Charter rights, and fell “closer to the less serious 
negligence or lack of due diligence end of the 
continuum”. The judge also held that the accused 
could have been stopped for Highway Traffic Act 
(HTA) purposes or to determine  whether the 
cellphone he  was using complied with the 
amended release conditions. As well, he noted that 
the expectation of privacy in a  vehicle was lower 
than in a home.
The accused was convicted of possessing  cocaine 
for the purpose of trafficking, and breach of 
recognizance for possessing the drugs. He was 
acquitted of breaching his recognizance for 
possessing more than one cellphone because it was 
not proven that the second cellphone was 
connected to a network and capable of supporting 
communication.
Ontario Court of Appeal
The accused argued that the 
trial judge erred in rejecting his 
s. 9 Charter racial profiling 
challenge and in not excluding 
the drugs under s. 24(2).
“Policing decisions based on race or racial stereotypes are not, by 
definition, objectively reasonable decisions”
“[T]here are two components to racial profiling. The first is the attitudinal component, 
which is the acceptance by a person in authority that race or racial stereotypes are 
relevant in identifying the propensity to offend or to be dangerous. The second is the 
causation component, which requires that this race-based thinking consciously or 
unconsciously motivate or influence, to any degree, decisions by persons in authority in 
suspect selection or subject treatment.”
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Racial Profiling
Justice  Paciocco, speaking for the unanimous 
Appeal Court, explained that “racial profiling has 
two components: (1) an attitudinal component; 
and (2) a causation component”:
The attitudinal component is the acceptance by 
a person in authority, such as a police officer, 
that race or racial stereotypes are relevant in 
identifying the propensity to offend or to be 
dangerous. The causation component requires 
that this race-based thinking must consciously 
or unconsciously play a causal role. Meaning, 
race or the racial stereotype must motivate or 
influence, to any degree, decisions by persons 
in authority regarding suspect selection or 
subject treatment. [reference omitted, para. 55]
He further added that, even if there is a reasoned 
foundation for suspect selection or subject 
treatment other than race or racial stereotyping, 
such as “reasonable  suspicion” or “reasonable 
grounds”, racial profiling could still exist if race  or 
racial stereotypes contributed to suspect selection 
or subject treatment. Racial profiling occurs where 
race or racial stereotypes are used “to any degree 
in suspect selection or subject treatment”. He 
opined that “policing decisions based on race or 
racial stereotypes are not, by definition, 
objectively reasonable decisions”: 
In my view, it is self-evident that a decision 
need not be motivated solely or even mainly on 
race or racial stereotypes to nevertheless be 
“based on” race or racial stereotypes. If 
illegitimate thinking about race or racial 
stereotypes factors into suspect selection or 
subject treatment, any pretence that the 
decision was reasonable is defeated. 
The decision will be contaminated by 
improper thinking and cannot satisfy 
the legal standards in place for suspect 
selection or subject treatment.
... Where race or racial stereotypes are 
used to any degree in suspect selection 
or subject treatment, there will be no 
reasonable suspicion or reasonable 
grounds. The decision will amount to 
racial profiling.
This outcome is sensible, even leaving aside 
questions about what reasonableness entails. If 
objective considerations could negate improper 
subjective rel iance on race or racial 
stereotypes, the subjective component of these 
legal standards would be ignored. That should 
not be. ... [T]he subjective component of the 
relevant legal standards plays an important role 
in ensuring that the police act for legitimate 
purposes and turn their minds to the legal 
authority they possess. A body of law that 
permits officers to exercise their power when 
subjectively, their decisions are influenced by 
race or racial stereotypes, has little to 
commend it.
Moreover, it would undermine other relevant 
interests at stake to accept that racial profiling 
does not occur even when race or racial 
stereotypes influence a decision, unless there is 
no reasonable foundation for that decision. ... It 
not only undermines effective policing by 
misdirecting resources and alienating members 
of the community, it “fuels negative and 
destructive racial stereotyping”. This mischief, 
including the offence against equality and 
human dignity, operates whenever race or 
racial stereotypes contaminate decision-making 
by persons in authority.
In sum, there are two components to racial 
profiling. The first is the attitudinal component, 
which is the acceptance by a person in 
authority that race or racial stereotypes are 
relevant in identifying the propensity to offend 
or to be dangerous. The second is the causation 
component, which requires that this race-based 
thinking consciously or unconsciously motivate 
or influence, to any degree, decisions by 
Charter of Rights
s. 9 Everyone has the right not 
to be arbitrarily detained or 
imprisoned.
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persons in authority in suspect selection or 
subject treatment. [references omitted, paras. 
62-66]
If racial profiling does occur, it will be considered 
an aggravating factor in the s. 24(2) analysis that 
will elevate the seriousness of the Charter breach.
Although the Court of Appeal did not make a 
finding about whether racial profiling occurred in 
this case or not, it did conclude that the trial judge 
erred. The trial judge implicitly  found the officer 
satisfied the attitudinal component of racial 
profiling by his comment. “The only rational 
interpretation of his finding is that the comment 
reflected [the officer’s] belief that there is a link 
between brown skin and drug dealing,”  said Justice 
Paciocco.
But the trial judge made two mistakes regarding the 
racial profiling causation component. “First, he 
believed improperly that the racist comment made 
by [the officer] could not support a  racial profiling 
finding because it was uttered after the decision to 
arrest had already been made,” said Justice 
Paciocco. “Second, he gave undue weight to what 
he felt were reasonable  grounds that would have 
justified [the accused’s] arrest in any event.” 
Timing of the Officer’s Comment
The Court of Appeal found the trial judge erred in 
permitting the timing of the officer’s comment to 
determine whether racial profiling occurred: 
As can be seen, the trial judge did not expressly 
find that [the officer] satisfied the attitudinal 
component of racial profiling. However, that 
finding is necessarily implicit in his reasoning.
These features of the decision make plain that 
the trial judge found [the officer] harboured 
r a c i a l s t e r e o t y p e s , c o n s c i o u s l y o r 
unconsciously. It is equally clear that the trial 
judge concluded the actual explanation for the 
comment was that it reflected an offensive, 
stereotypical link between race and crime. 
Even though he couched his finding gently, by 
referring to the “suggestion of racialized 
thinking inherent in the remark”, the only 
rational interpretation of his finding is that the 
comment reflected [the officer’s] belief that 
there is a link between brown skin and drug 
dealing. [paras. 70-71]
In giving undue and improper emphasis to the 
timing of the officer’s comment - that it occurred 
after the observations that provided the grounds for 
arrest were  made and after the officer had already 
decided to arrest the accused - the  trial judge failed 
to consider all of the circumstances surrounding the 
police action. “It was an error for the trial judge to 
isolate  the officer’s comment in this way,” said the 
Court of Appeal. “It is well established that after-
the-fact conduct by an accused person can be 
important circumstantial evidence in revealing 
their earlier state of mind. Similarly, if an officer’s 
state of mind is a material issue that officer’s 
relevant subsequent conduct, including comments 
made by the officer, can equally be used as 
circumstantial evidence of the officer’s earlier 
state of mind. And further:
Here, the comment reflected an attitude or 
belief, and attitudes or beliefs do not come and 
go in the moment. They are held. This is an 
important circumstance that remains relevant, 
even where a statement revealing the attitude 
or belief is made proximate to, but after, an 
impugned decision has been made. In those 
rare cases where conscious or unconscious 
racist attitudes or beliefs are exposed by 
evidence at trial relating to the event in 
question, the trial judge must closely consider 
whether the attitudes or beliefs – shown to be 
held by the officer at the time – may have 
contributed to the decision made. This can only 
properly be done by closely examining all of 
the circumstances of the case.
Here, for example, there was other evidence 
consistent with racial profiling. [The accused] is 
a man of colour who was driving an expensive 
car, a well-known risk factor for racial profiling. 
Within roughly 60 seconds of recognizing that 
[the accused] was not the suspect who was to 
be put under surveillance, [the officer] 
communicated [the accused’s] skin colour 
when describing his suspicious behaviour. [The 
officer] also precipitously chose to arrest [the 
accused] before completing his inquiry into the 
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release conditions. These features do not make 
inevitable a finding that [the officer] was racial 
profiling at the time but, as I say, they are 
consistent with racial profiling. The trial judge 
should have paid closer attention to these 
features of the case when considering whether 
the attitude reflected in [the officer’s] “brown 
guy who is a drug dealer” comment may have 
influenced the decision he made to arrest [the 
accused].
In addition, the officer provided what the trial 
judge found to be an incredible explanation for 
the comment he made. [references omitted, 
paras. 79-80]
The Presence of Reasonable Grounds
It was also an error for the  trial judge to hold that 
the presence of reasonable grounds defeated a 
finding of racial profiling. The Court of Appeal 
noted that the absence or fabrication of grounds 
can support an inference a detention was racially 
motivated while the presence of objective  grounds 
can be relevant in providing an innocent 
explanation for a decision to detain. Although, in 
an appropriate case, it may be open to a  trial judge 
to find an officer’s demonstrated conscious or 
unconscious racist attitude  did not influence the 
decisions that were made, “the presence of 
reasonable grounds does not disprove racial 
profiling,”  said Justice Paciocco. “The presence of 
objective grounds does not undermine a finding of 
racial profiling.”   Racial profiling can nevertheless 
exist even if an accused’s detention could 
otherwise be  justified apart from resorting to 
negative stereotyping based on race. 
The Search
The trial judge also erred in finding that the search 
incidental to the unlawful arrest complied with s. 8 
of the Charter. “To rely on the  search incident to 
arrest power requires a lawful arrest, and the trial 
judge found that [the accused] arrest was 
arbitrary,”  said the Court of Appeal. “The entire 
arrest was tainted, as was the search conducted 
incident to it.”
s. 24(2) Charter
The Court of Appeal also found the trial judge 
made mistakes in his s. 24(2) analysis. First, the 
failure  of the officers to “dig deeper” before 
arresting the accused fell more closely to the the 
“bad faith” end of the breach continuum and not 
“closer to the  less serious negligence or lack  of due 
diligence end of the continuum” as the trial judge 
concluded. Second, the police  could not have 
stopped the accused under the HTA or otherwise. 
“Had the police used the Highway Traffic Act to 
pursue a drug investigation, this would have been 
a pretence stop, contrary to the Charter,” said 
Justice Paciocco. “Nor could [the accused] have 
been stopped, as the trial judge believed, to check 
to see whether the cellphone he possessed 
complied with the terms of this new recognizance. 
There  were no grounds available  to the officers to 
believe that the cellphone [the accused] was 
observed with did not comply with the terms of his 
new recognizance. He would have been arbitrarily 
detained had he been pulled over to check 
randomly whether he was complying.”
The accused’s appeal was allowed, his convictions 
were set aside and a new trial was ordered.
Complete case available at www.ontariocourts.on.ca
“For an arrest to be lawful, two things must be established. First, the arresting officer 
must believe that he or she has reasonable grounds to make the arrest. ... Second, 
viewed objectively, the grounds articulated by the arresting officer must be reasonable; 
that is, a reviewing court must ask itself whether a person in the shoes of the officer 
would be able to conclude there were reasonable grounds for the arrest.”
“Had the police used the Highway Traffic 
Act to pursue a drug investigation, this 
would have been a pretence stop, 
contrary to the Charter.”
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ILLICT DRUG OVERDOSE 
DEATHS IN 2019
The Office of BC’s Chief Coroner has released 
statistics for illicit drug  toxicity deaths (formerly 
known as illicit drug overdose deaths) in the 
province from January 1, 2009 to June 30, 2019. In 
June 2019 there were 73 suspected drug toxicity 
deaths. This represents a -35% decrease over the 
number of deaths occurring in June 2018 and a 
-15% decrease over May 2019. 
In 2018, there were a total of 1,533 suspected drug 
overdose deaths. This was an increase of 38 deaths 
over the 2017 numbers (1,495). 
Overall, the 2018 statistics amount to about four 
(4) people dying every day of the year.
The 1,533  toxicity  deaths last year amounted to 
more than a 360%  increase over 2013. The report 
also attributed fentanyl laced drugs as accounting 
for the increase in deaths. 
People aged 30-39 were  the hardest hit so far in 
2019 with 146 illicit drug toxicity deaths followed 
by 40-49 year-olds and 50-59 years-old, at 118 
deaths in each category. People aged 19-29 had 95 
deaths. Vancouver had the most deaths at 144 
followed by Surrey (72), Victoria  (28), Abbotsford 
(24), Kamloops (19), Burnaby (19), and Kelowna 
(15).   
Males continue to die at 
a l m o s t a 4 : 1 r a t i o 
compared to females. In 
January 2019, 421  males 
had died while  there 
were 117 female deaths.
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The 2019 data indicates that most illicit drug 
toxicity deaths (87%) occurred inside while 12% 
occurred outside. For 7 deaths, the location was 
unknown. 
“Private residence” includes residences, driveways, 
garages, trailer homes.
“Other residence” includes 
hote l s , mote l s , rooming 
houses, shelters, etc.
“Other inside” includes facilities, occupational sites, 
public buildings and businesses.
“Outside” includes vehicles, streets, sidewalks,  parks, 
wooded areas, campgrounds and parking lots.
DEATHS SINCE PUBLIC HEALTH 
EMERGENCY
In April 2016, BC’s provincial health officer 
declared a public health emergency in response to 
the rise in drug overdoses and deaths. The number 
of overdose deaths in the 39 months preceding the 
declaration (Jan 2013-Mar 2016) totaled 1,449. 
The number of deaths in the 34 months following 
the declaration (Apr 2016-Jun 2019) totaled 4,340. 
This is an increase of almost 200%.
7263
77 155
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Other Residence
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Outside
Unknown
Deaths by location: Jan-Feb 2018
Source: Illicit Drug Toxicity Deaths in BC - January 1, 2009 to June 
30, 2019.  Ministry of Public Safety and Solicitor General, 
Coroners Service. August 16, 2019.
TYPES OF DRUGS
The top five detected drugs relevant to illicit drug overdose deaths from 2016 - 2018 were  fentanyl and its 
analogues, which was detected in 81.3%  of deaths, cocaine (50.1%), methamphetamine/amphetamine 
(31.9%), ethyl alcohol (27.0%), and heroin (17.4%). 
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“In Service: 10-8”
Sign-up Now
Are you interested in regularly receiving the In 
Service: 10-8 newsletter by email. You can sign 
up by clicking here and then clicking on the 
“Sign up” link:
This “Sign up” link will take you to the free 
Subscription Form that only requires an email. 
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Upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills Courses
To register for any of the following courses, click on the course code below or contact the JIBC 
Registration Office at 604.528.5590 or 1.877.528.5591 (toll free). You can check Ways to Register for 
other registration methods and for assistance from the registration office. View the full 2019 Course 
Calendar online for a full list of upcoming Investigation & Enforcement Skills courses in 2019.
UPCOMING ONLINE COURSES  
September 11-October 16, 2019 or
November 13-December 18, 2019
Introduction to Administrative Law (INVE-1002)
October 9-November 6, 2019
Internet Open Source Investigations (INVE-1022)
UPCOMING COURSES IN NEW 
WESTMINSTER  
September 9-11, 2019
Introduction to Criminal Law (INVE-1001) 
September 14, 2019
Personal Safety (INVE-1013) 
September 23-26
Application for and Execution of Search Warrants 
(INVE 1006)
September 30-October 4, 2019
Enhanced Investigative Interviewing (INVE 1004)
October 8, 2019
Testifying in Legal Proceedings/Hearings (INVE 1008)
October 15-17, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators (INVE 
1005)
UPCOMING COURSES IN VICTORIA
September 18-20, 2019
Report Writing for Professional Investigators 
(INVE-1005)
Apply for the Investigation & 
Enforcement Skills Certificate
Complete the Investigation & Enforcement Skills Certificate, 
an academic credential that can help you pursue or 
advance your in the field of investigation, enforcement and 
public safety. Many people who have completed the 
requirements for the certificate have gone on to a variety of 
rewarding careers. Apply online today. For more 
information, visit the Investigation & Enforcement Skills 
Certificate 
webpage.
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BACHELOR OF LAW ENFORCEMENT STUDIES
BACHELOR OF EMERGENCY & SECURITY MANAGEMENT
Expand your academic credentials and enhance your career options. 
Gain the theoretical background, applied skills and specialized 
knowledge for a career in public safety.
keeping communities safe
enforcing the law
on the front line
Apply today. JIBC.ca 604.528.5590    register@jibc.ca 
715 McBride Boulevard, New Westminster, BC
Be the one
